The
New
Collection

Edited by A.J.T.M. Mathijssen (Editor-in-Chief)

N. Goode, C. Grealis, M. Hallmannsecker, E. McDonald, B. Siritanaratkul.

The New Collection 2015

Contact Details

All submissions, subscriptions and business enquiries should be addressed to:
The New Collection MCR, New College, Holywell Street, Oxford, OX1 3BN.

E-mail: new.collection.mcr@gmail.com
Website: http://mcr.new.ox.ac.uk/journal

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[1]External reviewer from St. Peter's College, Oxford.

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Notes on Contributors

All contributors are members of the MCR of New College at the University of Oxford. They can be contacted at New College, Oxford OX1 3BN.

Willem van den Berg	MPhil International Relations
Tanja Collavo	DPhil Management Studies
Stephen Dillon	DPhil Social Policy
Nicholas Goode	MSt Music (Musicology)
Conal Grealis	BA Classics and French
Matthew R. de la Hey	MSc African Studies & MBA
Mike J. Lindsay	MPhil Russian and East European Studies
Chris de L'isle	DPhil Ancient History
Meindert Peters	MPhil Modern Languages

E-mail addresses are provided at the beginning of each article.

Editorial Welcome

This is the 10th edition of The New Collection and we are proud to publish a record number of articles this year – plenty of reason for a celebration! Submissions have come from a wide range of disciplines, highlighting but a fraction of the fascinating research undertaken at New College, Oxford.

Whereas each article is aimed for a general academic readership, it has been written and reviewed by experts in the field, both by Middle Common Room (MCR) peer reviewers and Senior Common Room (SCR) academic staff, both from New College and other colleges within the University of Oxford. We would like to thank this community for the extensive feedback received, and we trust numerous fruitful discussions and future projects will arise from this work.

Indeed, new contributions towards the next volume of this journal are strongly encouraged. Whether they are reexaminations of the works herein, or entirely new inspirations, we look forward to welcoming the latest research manuscripts. Submission guidelines are located at the back of the journal.

The cover photo we have chosen for this issue was taken by to compete in the annual MCR photo competition. Entitled 'Magnificent', it depicts 'New life waiting to burst forth on a cold spring morning.' Let this lift your inspirations and may your ventures flourish. Or in the words of William Blake (1757–1827):

> To see a world in a grain of sand and heaven in a wild flower,
> Hold infinity in the palms of your hand and eternity in an hour.

We hope you will enjoy reading this edition of The New Collection!

Arnold Mathijssen, Editor-in-chief
Eleanor McDonald, Publisher

MCR President's Foreword

The New Collection plays a central role in the intellectual life of New College, providing graduate students with the opportunity to contribute to an academic publication, to experience the rigorous process of peer review and to see their work in print.

I offer my thanks to the editorial team who put this edition together, and in particular to Arnold Mathijssen, this year's Editor-in-Chief.

It is rare indeed for an academic publication to be as interdisciplinary as the New Collection. This journal offers readers the opportunity to read scientific studies alongside archaeological articles and philosophical papers. It is a fascinating insight into the wonderful work being undertaken by the graduate students of New College.

This year, the committee was overwhelmed with submissions from across a broad range of subject areas. Each article is stimulating and unique, and it is only fitting that such fine scholarship be preserved for future generations in the annals of New College and on the shelves of the Bodleian library.

Genevieve Woods
MCR President 2014-2015

The Warden's Foreword

It is gratifying that this is twice as fat as any previous issue of The New Collection and that the markedly greater number of contributions has not come at the expense of quality or inherent interest - quite the opposite, in fact. The editors are to be congratulated on tapping the enormous reserves of scholarship and enterprise to be found in the MCR.

Young scholars and scientists are now publishing in one medium or other much earlier than previous generations, no doubt encouraged by the digital revolution and also by the growing necessity to launch one's career as soon as possible. Blogs and on-line journals are of course important and indeed essential in some disciplines, but there is nothing quite as satisfying as seeing one's first article in print, in hard copy, especially in a handsomely produced journal such as this.

Each article herein has benefitted from the help and advice of referees, both peers and members of the SCR. The best articles in any discipline are often a mixture of authorial boldness and editorial prudence. If this journal has helped some of its contributors grow thicker skins, then that alone justifies its existence.

The range of subjects represented here is very wide: economics and management; classical archaeology; business and African studies; modern languages; musicology; international law; and international relations. In what other scholarly journal would one find articles on Pope John Paul II, Pierre Boulez and Disneyland? Quite exceptionally, the editors have included two articles by the same author; it was felt that Somalian piracy and the conflict in Syria are sufficiently different and of such importance as to justify the inclusion of both.

My only disappointment is that no articles from STEM subjects are included. At the risk of overstepping my prerogative as foreword writer, I would encourage graduate students in, say, pharmacology, engineering or even pure mathematics to submit contributions to the next issue.

Sir Curtis Price, Warden of New College Oxford

Water, Blood, & Oil: Examining the Water War Hypothesis

Willem van den Berg*

Department of Politics and International Relations

The idea that freshwater scarcity is a global security threat has gained currency in both academic and policy circles. Oftentimes an analogy is made comparing the possible role of freshwater in the 21st century to oil's bloody role in the 20th century. This article critically examines the *water war hypothesis* and the comparison between freshwater scarcity and oil scarcity and comes to several conclusions. Firstly, freshwater is fundamentally different to oil in that it is usually used in non-consumptive ways, but also that it has a low level of substitutability and that it is not economically viable to transport in large quantities. This has significant political, economic, and security consequences. Secondly, though there is some theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the *water war hypothesis*, the evidence is underwhelming and does not reflect the large amount of rhetoric on water wars. Thirdly, this does not mean the concept is without merit, but merely that the critical level of water scarcity used in the hypothesis has not been met yet.

*Email: willem.vandenberg@new.ox.ac.uk

Introduction

The 20th century was marked by wars over competing political ideologies. With the end of the Cold War however, both international relations scholars and influential policy makers have sought to identify emerging security threats that could spark conflict in the coming decades. Scholars in the 1990s identified several threats, the most prominent being the *clash of civilizations* associated with cultural values such as religion (Huntington, 1996). Another perceived threat that has emerged in the post-Cold War security literature is resource scarcity. Oil is the best known example of a resource that can lead to violent conflict. The first large international conflict after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the First Gulf War, was primarily fueled by oil. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait for the oil fields, and the U.S. intervened partly because the region was globally significant due to its oil production (Painter, 2012). Although oil is the best known and best researched of the resources which can trigger conflict, fresh water is the most troubling. Water is a resource unlike any other because every living organism depends on water for survival. The implications of water scarcity are therefore potentially more profound than other resource scarcity. The causal link between freshwater scarcity and violent conflict has come to be known as the *water war hypothesis*, and it is a hypothesis that is starting to feature prominently in both academic circles and in the rhetoric of policy makers. Magazines such as *The Economist* have run several articles with the phrase "water war" in the title (2010, 2012), as have *The Guardian* (2014) and *Foreign Policy* (2014) more recently. An example of the political implications of the hypothesis is the following warning from the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

> In Central and South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the impacts of water scarcity are fueling dangerous tensions that will have repercussions for regional stability and U.S. foreign policy objectives. The national security implications of this looming water shortage - directly caused or aggravated by agriculture demands, hydroelectric power generation, and climate instability - will be felt all over the world (2011).

This paper first looks at the politico-economic similarities and differences between oil and fresh water, before going into a dialectic examination of the water war hypothesis and its antithesis.

Oil and Fresh Water

The history of oil in the 20th century is smeared with blood, and the history of war in the 20th century is smeared with oil. Oil scarcity has both triggered conflict itself and featured prominently in conflicts fought for other reasons. For instance, in WW2 Japanese grand strategy was dictated by complete dependency on foreign oil, and a US embargo on Japanese oil was one of the causes of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Similarly, Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union was largely motivated by German dependence on foreign oil, and when faced with the choice of taking Moscow or the oil fields in the Caucasus Hitler choose the black gold (Painter, 2012). More recently, the conflict over the Falkland Islands and both the first and second Gulf Wars were largely motivated by oil (Gleick, 1993). Water's reputation has not been bloodied yet. However, the connection has already been made by many, including former World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin who ominously stated "many of the wars of the 20th century were about oil, but wars of the 21st century will be over water" (Morrissette & Borer, 2004).

There is little reason for nations to compete over an abundant resource, but ample reasons to do so over a limited and scarce one. Oil is a limited resource and has often been scarce, this has caused it to create interstate conflict Although freshwater is a renewable resource, it is not unlimited and its availability is currently decreasing and will probably continue to do so due to unsustainable consumption, pollution, and climate change. Just as the U.S. experienced peak oil in the 1970s, environmental theorists like Peter Gleick (2010) are positing the idea of peak water [1]. An underground aquifer may have a natural recharge rate, but if the rate of water extraction exceeds the rate of recharge, a peak in freshwater extraction and consequent decline will be experienced.

When considering peak water there are three important differences between oil and water that have to be taken into account which are likely to have significant geopolitical implications. Firstly, water is often non-consumptive while oil is almost always consumptive. Water can often be recycled (by treating facilities or simply through the natural water cycle), while oil is rarely reusable. Secondly, oil has a high level of substitutability while water does not. For instance, energy needs can be met without relying on oil, but every living organism requires water

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[1] Peak Oil was a theory proposed by the geologist M. King Hubbert and his colleagues in the 1950s. He predicted that U.S. oil production would follow a bell shaped curve and peak somewhere between 1965 and 1970. His original paper seemed almost prophetic for many years, since U.S. oil production did peak in 1970, and then slowly declined for almost 40 years (Gleick, 2010). Recently however the introduction of new technologies and techniques such as hydraulic fracturing have allowed previously inaccessible oil to be recovered. As a consequence U.S crude oil production has started to increase again. Whether similar technological advances can halt peak water is contested among scholars.

for life. Some needs that water currently meets, such as cleaning and cooling, can be replaced with other substances. But there are certain needs that water is the only substance capable of meeting, such as drinking. Thirdly, it is economically viable to transport oil over large distances but it is not economically viable to do the same with freshwater. A supertanker filled with oil worth $70 a barrel can carry over $250 million of cargo. The same supertanker filled with freshwater would only be worth $0.5 million (Gleick, 2010). The only instance where it would be economically feasible to transport freshwater in this way is if the price of freshwater were to skyrocket, a situation which would cause more problems than it would solve.

The good news is that although oil may eventually run out, freshwater will not. Freshwater is naturally renewed, can be recycled, and can often be repeatedly reused in non-consumptive uses like cleaning and cooling. The bad news is that the amount of freshwater available is decreasing through unsustainable consumption, pollution, and climate change, while the demand for fresh water is increasing through exponential population growth in conjunction with industrializing economies. Humanity has become dependent on oil, but it will be able to wean itself off if necessary due to the availability of oil substitutes. Freshwater is absolutely necessary for human life however, and it is not economically viable to transport freshwater from abundant regions to scarce regions. The very nature of freshwater may mean that hydro-politics in the 21st century will be a much tougher issue than petroleum politics ever was in the 20th century.

Thesis: Water Wars

Since the end of the Cold War the water war hypothesis has grown in popularity. Shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Peter Gleick wrote an influential article entitled "Environment and security: The clear connection" (1991). This article outlined the case for seeing environmental issues such as scarcity as a potential cause for conflict. The recent Gulf War was a case in point for Gleick. Population growth, inequitable and wasteful use of natural resources, and the devastation of critical environmental services are a threat to the global environment, which in turn is a threat to human security since the geophysical and geopolitical realms are growing closer together. For Gleick, writing in 1991, there had been several recent examples of water related international tensions. For example, in 1990 Turkey stopped the flow of the Euphrates River into Syria and Iraq in order to fill a reservoir, against the vehement protests of its neighbors. Since then Turkey has been able to threaten its neighbors with the possibility of

diverting the Euphrates, a move which would be devastating to the downstream countries. Gleick has since then expanded his theory and continues to be one of the main proponents of the *water war hypothesis*. In essence his idea is that resources and environmental concerns have started to play an increasingly important role in international politics, and that when water is scarce nations will see it as a matter of national security.

There are many historic examples of water sources as both a military target and a political goal[2]. The Middle East has often been the battleground for these events. In the 1960s the Arab League tried to divert the Jordan River away from Israel which contributed to the Six Day War of 1967. During this time Israeli prime minster Levi Eshkol declared "water is a question of life for Israel" (Gleick, 1993). Later Egyptian president Anwar Sadat stated that "the only matter that could take Egypt back to war again is water" (Ibid). According to the proponents of the *water war hypothesis* both history and current rhetoric from world leaders indicate that water scarcity is an issue which contributes to armed conflict. This notion seems to be supported by empirical data. A study done in 2000 has shown that sharing a river increases the probability of violent conflict in a pair of countries (Toset, Gleditsch & Hegre).

Water scarcity can also lead to intrastate conflict. Thomas Homer-Dixon, one of the most prominent environmental conflict scholars, argues that water scarcity within a county weakens the state itself because it both increases the demands on the government while at the same time reducing its capacity. This weakening of the state can cause deprivation conflicts such as civil strife and insurgencies. Homer-Dixon is quick to add that water scarcity can also lead to interstate violence. Although states go to war more frequently over non-renewable resources like oil, renewable resources can also lead to war, and freshwater is the most likely of the renewable resources to spark international conflict (1994). Some scholars believe that though water scarcity can lead to conflict, it can also facilitate international cooperation. Dinar (2009) argues that on an interstate level moderate water scarcity stimulates cooperation rather than competition. When there is no scarcity, there is also no need for cooperation. Moderate scarcity encourages some cooperation, but under extreme scarcity cooperation is replaced with competition. This ensures that the scarcity-cooperation graph is represented by a bell curve. Still, the power relations of the two countries that share a water resource have to be taken into account. For instance, if two countries share a river, cooperation is likelier when the powerful country is downstream. This is

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[2]As far back as the 7th Century B.C. the capture of water wells was used as a strategy in dessert warfare in Arabia. Some more recent examples include WW2, where dams and dikes were bombed, and in the First Gulf War both sides tried to destroy dams and desalination plants (Gleick 1993).

because the powerful country is dependent on its upstream neighbour for the river flow, but it can also use its superior military might to coerce its neighbor into cooperation. When the stronger country is upstream, cooperation is necessary for the weaker country which typically does not have any hard bargaining power. Within this model there is still room for pessimism because cooperation is not always positive. Many river treaties, such as the Ganges, Nile, and Jordan river treaties, include unfair, token, and sometimes even coercive elements (Zietoun & Mirumachi, 2008). If left untreated, these unfair elements can lead to increased international tension.

Antithesis: Hydro-political hyperhole [3]

Not everyone is equally convinced by the *water war hypothesis*, and rightfully so. Most of the support for the hypothesis rests on statements by politicians, theoretical models, and specific case studies. The first weakness is that statements made by politicians cannot count as evidence for the accuracy of a theory predicting actual conflict. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a prominent Egyptian politician and former secretary general of the United Nations, predicted in 1991 and again in 1997 that the next war in the Middle East would be fought over water, not politics (Boutros-Ghali, 1997). This prediction has now been proven false many times over in the last two decades. A prominent recent example is the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya where water played no role but oil arguably did. In fact, a study from the Cold War already indicated that the frequency of threats of war have no correlation to the actual onset of a war (Leng, 1980).

Secondly, the theory of scarcity and of human dependency on water is also exaggerated. It is true that no living organism can function without water, but the amount of water directly used to sustain life is a small fraction of the total freshwater consumption. Furthermore, as water becomes scarcer techniques of water use will improve to allow for more efficient use of water, especially in water intense sectors such as agriculture. Advancing technology will also allow for more water to be recycled, and for desalination plants to become more cost effective. Freshwater is limited, but ocean water is virtually inexhaustible and the only current limitation of desalination is financial.

Thirdly, an almost complete lack of unambiguous empirical evidence for the *water war hypothesis* is the most damning critique of it. Apart from a war that took place 4,500 years ago, there have been no wars explicitly fought over

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[3]For this title and some of the ideas I am indebted to the work of David Katz and his work Hydro-political Hyperbole (2011).

water (Wolf, 1999). In every other war involving water, the issue of water itself was merely a contributing factor. For example, the 1967 Six Day War is often touted as an example of a war in which the Arab League's attempts to divert the Jordan River away from Israel played an important role in causing the war, but to say that this directly caused the war is to simplify the situation and to misunderstand causality. In every recent case where water has played a role in armed international conflict it has done so as a bit part player in an already tense and hostile context. The empirical data supporting the *water war hypothesis* is either absent or ambiguous at best.

Finally, much of the empirical evidence supporting the *water war hypothesis* is overstated or misunderstood. For instance, the authors of the study showing that countries that share rivers have an increased propensity for conflict have partly reneged on their earlier work. They revisited the topic several years later and found out that although there is more conflict, this does not necessarily support a scarcity stimulates conflict theory. Drier countries are more likely to go to war, but drought has absolutely no effect. In fact, the main predictor of conflict turned out to be the basin size, with larger basins correlating to less conflict (Gleditsch et al, 2006).

Then why is the *water war hypothesis* so prominent? In a 2009 literature review it was found that there are three times as many articles on water conflict than there are on water cooperation, and the articles on conflict are five times as likely to be cited (Gupta and Van der Zaag). Several explanations exist for this interesting phenomenon. The first is that during the Cold War certain fears became prevalent in society and since the end of the Cold War policy makers have attempted to justify these fears. The problem is structural and has to do with fulfilling the catastrophe quota. Put simply, people want to find threats to explain their own behavior (Mueller, 1994). Another explanation is that academic researchers are likely to focus on gloomy scenarios instead of happy ones for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is more funding for research that deals with conflict. Secondly, bad news sells better than good news. Thirdly, humans have a psychological predisposition to focus on bad news rather than good news. Lastly, it is often thought that presenting a negative picture can motivate others into positive action (Simon, 1980). These explanations all have to do with the concept of securitization[4]. When a topic is mentioned as a potential security threat it automatically increases in importance. By utilizing the words "violent conflict" and"water war", the issue of water scarcity takes on a level of importance that it

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[4]The word securitization was first proposed by Ole Waever in 1995, and later developed into its own field of International Relations. In a nutshell, securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary means in the name of security (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998).

could not achieve if the focus was on cooperation. Policy makers, scholars, and journalists alike who are working on issues of water scarcity therefore all have incentives to securitize water scarcity[5].

Synthesis: Not a Reality, Still a Threat

The critique of the water war hypothesis is not without a critique itself. The fact that apart from a war 4,500 years ago there have been no documented wars fought specifically over water sheds no light on the likelihood of it occurring in the future. The *water war hypothesis* itself is based on a changing world where the demand for fresh water is growing exponentially while the supply is diminishing. Pointing towards a lack of historical precedence misses the point. Any conflict theory based on scarce resources can be applied to freshwater, provided it is a valid scarcity theory in the first place. If there are no real world conflicts to support the theory, this simply means that freshwater has not yet reached the critical stage of scarcity.

Although only a fraction of the water being used is actually necessary for human life and hypothetically societies could alter the way they consume water, in reality societies often do not wish to alter their way of life and choose to go to war rather than adopt necessary structural reform. Similarly, hoping for a technological silver bullet such as cheaper processes of desalination is to simply avoid the issue altogether. Technological solutions may not arrive, if they do they will most likely be limited to the rich and developed countries, and even then it may be too late in the sense that the scarcity will have already had ample time to fuel violent conflict.

As a synthesis of both the *water war hypothesis* and its critique, in combination with the theory of peak water, this paper posits that:

1. Fresh water is a resource unlike any other and deserves to be treated as such by the security literature.

2. The amount of scholarly literature and political rhetoric on the water war hypothesis far exceeds the reality of the concept.

3. The water war hypothesis still has merit, but as a theory whose assumption of scarcity has not yet been met, rather than an accurate reflection of the present or the past.

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[5]In *Hydro-political Hyperbole* (2011), David Katz shows exactly why each different group has an incentive to exaggerate the water war hypothesis

In all of this it is important to remember that the whole notion of the *water war hypothesis* is not to publish articles or fill catastrophes quotas, even if in reality this is sometimes what is has become. The concept is there as a tool to understand where threats lie and how they can be best avoided. The *water war hypothesis* is potentially useful but it should not be exaggerated either.

Conclusion

Part of the challenge about researching security threats is that a threat should ideally be identified before it actually leads to conflict. Oil needs have proven to be a source of conflict over the past century and the question on many minds now is whether fresh water needs will play the same role in the 21st century. This paper posits that the *water war hypothesis* is not an accurate reflection of the present or the past, but that it could become an accurate reflection of the future depending on the level of scarcity. If the 20th century provides any indication of what the 21st century will bring, we should expect conflict sparked by resource scarcity, and of all the possible resources to spark conflict fresh water is perhaps the most troubling.

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The Internationalization of Disneyland: Where Dreams Come True Marketing Success

Tanja Collavo[*]

Saïd Business School

Disneyland theme parks are perceived everywhere in the world as happy places where nothing can go wrong. When they first opened abroad, however, they encountered many issues and in two cases out of three caused significant financial losses for the Disney corporation. This article will explore the difficulties in internationalizing a very American experience and Disney's marketing rationale for opening a new park in Shanghai in the face of all the risks and problems this further international expansion might bring.

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[*]Email: tanja.collavo@new.ox.ac.uk

Introduction

There is a wide literature concerning the internationalization of Disney theme parks, an excellent case study to explore all the different issues companies face when exporting their product or service in a foreign country: liability of newness (need to establish new relations with powerful incumbents, to create new roles and to learn how do things), poor understanding of the local culture, difficulty in obtaining the permission to operate in a given country, etc.. According to past literature, the opening of Tokyo Disneyland was a big success. From the very first year the number of visitors was greater than expected, its financial results were positive and its public acceptance was constantly growing. For example, in 1999, the Israeli sociologist Aviad Raz (1999) wrote: *". . . it is as if Tokyo Disneyland had always been around. It is taken for granted as a popular destination for school excursions, hospitality tours, hanabi parties in the summer and New Year celebrations"*.

The same enthusiasm, however, did not apply to the other resorts that Disney opened outside of the U.S., namely Disneyland Paris and Hong Kong Disneyland. Even before their inauguration, both of them faced a lot of issues which can be related to the following macro factors: public criticism due to excessive government concessions; difficulties in adapting to the local culture; protests from environmental activists; poorly conceived pricing strategies; poor understanding of local habits; high turnover due to strict employees management; bad reviews as a consequence of amateurish PR. According to these findings, it would make no sense for the U.S. Corporation to build another park in Shanghai (due to open in December 2015), above all using a joint venture with the Chinese government. In fact, not only did two resorts out of the three established abroad represented losses for the American corporation, but the worst performing park was Hong Kong Disneyland where Disney established a join venture with the local government retaining a high degree of control over operations.

Under such circumstances, understanding Disney's expansionary international strategy requires both a deeper analysis of Disney's economic results, in order to verify previous claims on parks' performance, and a broader approach going beyond financial achievements and accounting ratios. Indeed, as Giroux (2009) and Clavé (2007) pointed out in their works, the opening of a Disney theme park represents much more than a diversification strategy. It creates the opportunity to shape the development of society and consumption habits (Bryman, 2004; Ritzer, 2010), it allows the spreading of Disney's values and corporate culture in a very attractive and involving way for Disney's main target, it creates visibility for all the other products of the corporation, it allows the

testing and development of merchandising techniques (Grant, 2002) and it makes each visitor shape their own tie to Disney by providing a magical world full of possibilities that each "guest" perceives as created just for him/her (Dholakia & Schroeder, 2001). The expected outcomes of these side effects are a higher consumption of Disney products and a higher degree of brand awareness.

Therefore, the success of the internationalization of Disney theme parks should be evaluated taking into consideration also this marketing function, not only its financial results. Since no comprehensive analysis existed on this topic, this article aims to explore such a possibility, firstly by verifying whether or not the poor performance of international Disney theme parks reported by previous literature is as bad as described and secondly by exploring if, despite losses and bad reviews, the internationalization of Disney theme parks can still be considered a success when analyzed from a marketing perspective. Whilst the poor financial results were fully confirmed, evidence regarding the marketing effectiveness of the parks provided no definite answers.

Disney International Theme Parks

The idea to create a Disney theme park came to the mind of Walt Disney in the mid '30s, while watching his daughters playing on a carousel. As he was bored whilst seated on a bench, he realized he would have liked going to a park where the whole family could have fun in a safe and joyful environment. On July 17, 1955 the first Disney theme park opened in Anaheim, California, with TV coverage and 30,000 guests. Disney's imagineer (imagination/parks engineer) Alex Wright wrote in his book: *"Disneyland opened its gates to the world and changed our perceptions of fantasy and reality, the possible and the impossible, and even our definition of family itself"* (Wright, 2005).

In 1983, Disney's Parks and Resorts division officially began its internationalization by opening in Tokyo the first Magic Kingdom outside of the U.S.. Japanese investors had long tried to convince Disney's management to set up a resort in their own country. However, fearful of investing in a zone with a totally different culture and climate conditions, The Walt Disney Company had always refused to undertake such a risky venture. Only at the end of the '70s, the increasing success of its parks and the possibility to leave the ownership of the Tokyo one to the Oriental Land Company (a Japanese corporation which still owns it) made the U.S. multinational finally give its approval for the project. In the first ten years, Tokyo Disneyland cumulatively attracted more visitors than the Japanese population, becoming the world's most visited theme park. In 2001 the Oriental Land Company (OLC) inaugurated Tokyo DisneySea, the first Disney

theme park based on a maritime concept (OLC, 2007).

The unexpected success of the Japanese venture instilled in Disney's new CEO Michael Eisner the idea of making a similar investment in Europe. Europe already represented a quarter of Disney's revenues from consumer products. Besides, it had always been one of the major markets for Disney's movies and it had a population and affluence allowing the construction of a Disney resort (Grant, 2002). After many proposals on the part of different countries Paris was chosen in 1987 as the perfect place for the Euro Disney resort. Indeed, it was in the centre of Europe in geographical terms and, additionally, a main tourism destination. However, contrary to what had happened in Japan, here Disney encountered a strong opposition to its project. Claims and protests came from local farmers, who did not accept the expropriation of fertile territories to allow the construction of the park; from the citizens of nearby towns, who wanted to keep the quiet and peaceful atmosphere of the rural area where the resort had been located; from environmentally friendly associations, which were afraid of the increasing pollution and ecosystems destruction that would have derived from the park; from French intellectuals, who believed Disneyland would have marked Europe's invasion from the part of American consumerism and imperialism. In the attempt to reduce the initial criticism and create a park in tune with European tastes, Disney's management undertook a massive communication campaign and a partial redesign of the resort that tremendously increased the initial budget (that passed from 7.15 to 11 billion Francs, *i.e.* from around 1 to 1.6 billion Euros).

As a result, even if in the first years the attendance was similar to that expected and the resort was generally appreciated by European citizens, Euro Disney experienced huge losses, much bigger than initially forecasted and at a level that was unacceptable even considering the park had just been opened. This demanded further adjustments of the park, new marketing solutions and a couple of recapitalizations. Despite the efforts, the success in terms of visitors and the opening of a second theme park in 2002 (Walt Disney Studios), at the time of this study resort was still considered almost bankrupt (after losses of €41.6 million in 2007 and €63 million in 2009). Besides, it suffered from the lack of a clear identity due to the contrasting pressures of being both an American experience and an environment reflecting European cultures.

At the end of the '90s, disregarding the failure of Euro Disney and pushed by the success of other theme parks (which in 2011 were contributing to 28% of Disney's total revenues) and by the rapid growth of Asian economies, Disney's management decided to open a Magic Kingdom in Hong Kong. To reduce the risk of the investment, the U.S. Corporation made the Hong Kong government fund the 80% of the initial cost of the park in exchange for a 57% control in the resort's

management company. The latter ended up being a partnership characterized by the inherent and predictable contrasts between a private corporation and a public body and between U.S. and Hong Kong cultures, which significantly slowed down the decisional process from the very beginning. This factor, together with the small size of the park and the lack of understanding of the local culture made Hong Kong Disneyland an even worse investment than the European one. Indeed, the number of visitors always remained well below the break-even target and the resort was heavily beaten in terms of success and appreciation by its direct competitors such as Hong Kong Ocean Park.

The Financial Aspects of the Parks

Overall, the analysis from a business point of view led to more doubts than certainties about the success of the internationalization of Disney theme parks. According to quantitative indicators (such as revenues growth, return on investment, operating profit and return on assets) the only resort that was really worth opening abroad was Tokyo Disneyland. In fact, it was the best performer according to all financial indicators, with the exception of cash flows and current ratio, and, being the only profitable park, it was the only investment actually contributing to the positive performance of the Disney's Parks and Resorts division. More difficult to judge is Disney's decision to expand in France and in Hong Kong. While financial indicators, apart from revenues and (in the case of Disneyland Paris) cash flows, would have suggested that these parks were failures of the internationalization process, non-financial indicators shaded a more positive light on them. Indeed, both Paris and Hong Kong Disneyland showed increasing number of visitors, per capita spending, hotel occupancy and diversity of visitors' composition. Similar conclusions derived from the qualitative analysis, proving Tokyo as successful in satisfying all of its key stakeholders (shareholders, customers, employees, local authorities and communities) while highlighting some difficulties for Paris and Hong Kong Disneyland.

The French park has improved a lot in the last decade and has seemed to satisfy the local community. However, the results for its shareholders were poor and mixed reviews were retrieved as far as customers' and employees' satisfaction were concerned. The situation of Hong Kong Disneyland was overall negative in terms of satisfaction of key constituents. However, in this case, more time should probably be allowed in order to have significant data to make a final statement. Additionally, data at corporate level showed that the more Disney's Parks and Resorts division was internationalizing, the lower became both its average return on foreign assets and its return on all the assets possessed both home and abroad.

Also in terms of revenues, the opening of new parks abroad made no impact whatsoever as in the last fifteen years Disney's resorts and vacations packages were always responsible for around 28% of the corporation's sales.

To conclude, despite both quantitative and qualitative indicators showed positive signs for the performance of Tokyo Disneyland and mixed ones for the performances of Paris and Hong Kong Disneyland (more positive for the French and more negative for the Hong Kong resort), from a business point of view the internationalization of Disney theme parks overall was not a success. Probably, the criticism and the negative press coverage were exaggerated considering that even Paris and Hong Kong's parks grew and improved from many points of view. However, internationalizing successfully should imply enhancing the performance of the business and this was clearly not the case for Disney's Parks and Resorts division.

The Marketing Function of the Parks

The analysis from a marketing point of view established that international Disney theme parks had many characteristics making them classifiable as a marketing instrument. They were a means to promote the brand across key target segments, to inform the customers about the company's offer, to increase Disney's media exposure, to exploit cross-branding opportunities, to achieve deep customer focus and the rejuvenation of the product life-cycle and to distribute products. Whether or not they were an effective marketing instrument in the last decade, though, was much more difficult to judge. Traditional theoretical models could not be easily applied to this case due to both the lack of data and the impossibility of isolating the outcomes of the parks from those of other marketing campaigns used by Disney. Nonetheless, quantitative and qualitative indicators such as revenues and sales of Disney products from the regions in which the parks were opened, cost per contact (amount of money spent to reach a potential customer), number of Disney stores opened and box office results or prices paid in the park for Disney products available even in other locations such as DVDs or t-shirts suggested that, during the period under analysis, the international marketing strategy of Disney as a whole was successful. In fact, in all these regards Disney experienced a significant growth in the period under analysis.

Within the marketing strategy of the Disney corporation as whole, however, the role of foreign Disney theme parks, with very few exceptions such as the press coverage or website traffic, appeared to be low or sometimes even negative (such as in the case of contribution margins, cost per contact or relative prices). As a consequence, the raison-d'être of theme parks became clearer

only when additional qualitative aspects, which went beyond standard marketing performance measures, were taken into consideration. Phenomena like fostering consumption through theming, the "Disneyzation of society" (Bryman, 2004) or the promotion of Disney's cultural products suggested that, no matter the business success of a park, a new opening of a Disneyland could still make sense if its customers were happy and loyal enough to make it become an effective marketing tool.

Summing up these considerations, the evaluation from a marketing perspective of Tokyo Disneyland, Disneyland Paris and Hong Kong Disneyland could be judged as being overall positive. However, doubts arose on the advertising effectiveness of the French resort, due to its inability to target a specific nationality, and on that of Hong Kong as far as experience of cultural products was concerned. Indeed, the willingness to pay for a cultural product (that by definition can't be judged before its purchase), is strongly dependent on customers' appreciation of previous experiences. As a consequence, the struggles that Hong Kong park proved to have in terms of customers' satisfaction and local acceptance might have weakened this potential outcome. Further research would be important to confirm these impressions with information enabling the isolation of the outcomes of theme parks from the ones of other marketing campaigns.

Discussion

Internationalizing has never been an easy strategy. In the worst cases, as the studies of Lu and Beamish (2001) and Collins (1990) discovered, exporting and investing abroad reduced dramatically the profitability of a company. In the most successful ones, a period of learning and commitment is still needed before revenues, income and market power compensated for the efforts in overcoming the liability of foreignness (Brannen, 2004). The internationalization of Disney theme parks was not an exception in this sense.

On the one hand, Paris and Hong Kong Disneyland became a clear example of how foreign direct investment has the potential to both reduce the profits and increase the indebtedness of a company. On the other hand, the successful venture of Tokyo Disneyland, presenting a profitability lower than the one of U.S. resorts, proved that even when internationalizing supports the growth of a company, the difficulties in transferring core resources and capabilities across borders still risks hampering performance. Generally speaking, the main challenges that Disney encountered in foreign countries were mostly related to cultural differences and to the tough balance between adapting to local tastes and keeping a consistent global image and quality level. Overall, by reviewing past literature on the topic,

it seems as if the evolution of Disney's Parks and Resorts division in the last fifteen years was driven more by the conviction that broader is better rather than by a careful analysis of the risks and benefits of internationalizing. Indeed, with the unique exception of Tokyo, in the period 2000-2010 most of the reviews concerning foreign resorts were reporting the problems they were facing in terms of shareholders' satisfaction, financial losses and fine tuning with foreign cultures. What seems to have worked particularly well in the Tokyo case was the perfect alignment between the service culture of Disney and Japan (Japanese workers contrarily to European ones are happy to respect any rule and dress requirement they are asked to respect and put customers' satisfaction always at the top of their priorities), the passion of Japanese people for cartoons-related holidays and entertainment and the fact that Disney left the ownership of the park to a local company. All conditions that could not be/were not replicated in the other countries where Disney decided to expand its parks operations.

The analysis of foreign resorts from a business perspective did not support in almost any way Disney's decision to open more and more parks abroad in the last decade. Indeed, according to financial indicators, the only successful site between 2000 and 2010 was Tokyo Disneyland, with both the French and the Hong Kong complexes registering constant losses, decreasing (or negative) operating profits and margins, low earnings per share and high leverage. Even non-financial indicators like the number of visitors, the market share or the hotel occupancy, despite showing signs of growth for the two above-mentioned parks, overall promoted only the performance of Tokyo Disneyland. Finally, the analysis also focused on the satisfaction of key stakeholders (shareholders, customers, employees and local government and communities), generally presented very positive outcomes uniquely for Tokyo's parks, while highlighting negative results for Hong Kong Disneyland and mixed ones for Disneyland Paris. The most worrisome data concerned the relationship between the degree of internationalization of Disney's Parks and Resorts division and its profitability. Indeed, the more the business was expanding abroad, the lower both its return on foreign assets and its return on total assets became. Since growth and profitability clearly could not justify Disney's strategy in terms of theme parks' internationalization, the focus of the thesis became the search of other possible underlying motives.

Establishing that Disney theme parks were not only a business but also a marketing instrument was quite straightforward as many past studies and evidence supported this claim. For example, many researches confirmed the positive relationship between theming and consumption, while articles, books and observations led to the conclusion that Disney resorts were helpful in gathering information on the target market, in influencing purchasing behaviour,

in increasing the press coverage and thus the brand recognition of the company and in promoting Disney's offer by associating its products to a lifetime immersive and participative experience. Much more challenging was the measurement of the actual effectiveness of such a marketing tool. This conclusion, besides of weakening the marketing rationale to open parks outside of U.S. borders, seemed inconsistent with past literature, which sort of took for granted that the parks could be a great way of market Disney and its different products. Existing literature, indeed, often stressed the important effects of Disney resorts in terms of spreading the usage of theming and merchandising, of promoting Disney's cultural products by allowing to experience them and of reinforcing the company's brand image through the diffusion of its culture, values and spirit.

When this qualitative information, together with that obtained through observations, the questionnaire, articles and books is included in the analysis, Disney's internationalization moves become more justifiable and understandable. Indeed, their benefits were many: from the simple immersion of visitors in a fantastic world which favored the consumption of Disney's other products to the "Disneyzation" of the communities reached by the resorts.

A further analysis would however be advisable to support these latter statements with more precise data. The biggest limitation of this study was the impossibility of obtaining from Disney detailed data that would permit a quantitative analysis matching attendance trends and parks' developments with their direct marketing effects. To carry out such an analysis, unaggregated financial data on, for example, sales of consumer products in Disney stores, box office revenues and press coverage on a country basis would be needed together with a higher number of questionnaires or interviews to the customers of the park. Only in this way it would be possible to try to infer the marketing impact of a specific park on the overall performance of Disney, isolating it from the influence of all other Disney marketing activities. This, in turn, would permit more accurate predictions to be made concerning whether the opening of Shanghai Disneyland is really justified or how to make this opening count as much as possible in terms of marketing results.

Disney now has a year left to turn its new Shanghai Disneyland resort dream into a success like Tokyo Disneyland and not into a nightmare like the Hong Kong one. The company has a long experience in international theme parks providing examples of both successes and failures. There is much it can learn and improve upon. The story of Disneyland Paris suggested that the first step to ensure the effectiveness of the park both as a business and as a marketing campaign is to adapt it to local tastes while keeping it in line with Disney's global image. In this sense, Disney seems to have moved in the right direction: Shanghai Disneyland

will not be an exact replica of the Magic Kingdom in the U.S.. It will have an interactive castle, no traditional Main Street U.S.A. and it will feature a green area reserved for local celebrations and customs.

These changes could have two important outcomes: they could make the park more appealing for Chinese people, who are not likely to look for a truly U.S. experience like the Japanese, and at the same time they should attract foreign tourists willing to experience a Disneyland slightly different from traditional ones. Additionally, looking at the damages that bad press reviews caused both in France and Hong Kong, it would be advisable for Disney to train and monitor closely its Chinese PR team. The objective would be to have faster and more complete answers to the questions posed by the public opinion and a greater control over the consistency between the announcements coming from different parts of the corporation. Past experience would suggest as well to give more decision power to local owners and managers, limiting Disney's role to the design of the park and to the constant control of its quality and service level as it happened in Japan.

The observations made in Paris would also ask for a more effective management of merchandising. Indeed, the French park did not seem to fully exploit the potential revenue-generation of souvenirs. Other suggestions deriving from the business analysis and from on-site observations would include: providing hotel guests additional benefits like "fastpasses" and extra park hours (as done in Paris) in order to promote stays inside the resort; changing parades and shows at least once a year to favour repeat visits; carefully selecting employees to make sure they are in line with Disney's culture so to avoid complaints even when tough schedules and boring jobs are required; including from the beginning all Disneyland's most famous attractions in the Shanghai project (contrarily to what was done in Hong Kong) to generate positive word-of-mouth from the part of people who already experienced other parks; being active from the beginning in community's projects and environmentally-friendly practices so to keep the park in line with Western standards.

In order to make more definite claims on the success or to give Disney more accurate suggestions to effectively manage its new Shanghai park, further analyses would be needed based on data from Disney corporation before they get aggregated into the balance sheet.

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Review of literature on the issue of Somali piracy including analysis of the UK Governments policy response: Preventing and Reducing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

Stephen Dillon[*]

Department of Social Policy and Intervention

With a global cost of $30 billion, piracy is of significant international concern. For Somalia however, development of piracy originated as a local struggle against illegal fishing and the disposal of toxic waste which threatened the livelihood of an impoverished population already suffering from famine, drought and political turmoil. This literature review examines some of the key texts on the issue of piracy in and around the territorial waters of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, to provide a contextual background for subsequent analysis of the UK Governments *Policy Preventing and Reducing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia*. The review finds a preoccupation with the economic impact of piracy and Islamic terrorism, but also consensus on the solution to Somali piracy being on land rather than through sole deployment of a maritime force. The analysis finds both strengths and weaknesses in the UK Governments policy response, and although overwhelmingly maritime focused, exhibits a robust and coherent response to piracy and the endemic problems of Somalia found on land.

[*]Email: stephen.dillon@new.ox.ac.uk

Introduction

For Somalia, development of the current situation began as a struggle against foreign fishing vessels endangering the 'livelihood' of an already impoverished population (Singh and Bedi, 2012, p.8). With subsequent kidnappings such as the Chandlers, the British couple held for over a year (The Times, 2012, non-paginated) and a global cost of $30 billion (Bensassi, 2011, p.20) piracy has become a salient international concern. Although piracy is not a new phenomenon, and once regarded acceptable as state sanctioned 'privateering', it is now unacceptable to western society (Colás and Mabee, 2010, p.85-87). As Somalia exhibits no state monopoly of force ascribed to the state by Weber (Weber cited in Krahmann, 2010, p.21) – violence is in the hands of non-state actors. Therefore, despite the global impact, and realism remaining the dominant paradigm within traditional Security Studies (Collins, 2010, p.2-5) there can be no 'realist' state-on-state solution (Osei-Tutu, 2011, p.6-7).

Since the end of the Cold War, acts of piracy have increased to the extent that piracy is now 'more prevalent than at any other time in history' with 'hot spots' in the waters off the Horn of Africa, Nigeria, the Bay of Bengal and the major shipping route through the Strait of Malacca connecting the Indian and Pacific Ocean, and in the seas of Southeast Asia (Bueger, Stockbrügger and Werthes, 2011, p.356). Yet, out of all of these flashpoints, it is Somalia which has helped put piracy on the global security agenda, coming under the gaze in particular of both NATO and the European Union, and moreover, while academic research has been slow to engage with 'the concept of maritime security', academics have not been slow in the case of Somali piracy (Stockbrügger and Bueger, 2014, non-paginated).

In the first section of this article, following a brief contextual overview of the phenomenon of piracy, I review the literature on the key texts relating to the issue of piracy in the region of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. While the scope of this review cannot accommodate a full discussion of this fascinating topic, it nonetheless highlights the most salient themes found within the corpus of literature, such as the naval response, legality and prosecution, Islamic terrorism, application of analytical frameworks, the academic response and the human cost of piracy: the review finds a preoccupation with both the economic impact of piracy and Islamic terrorism. The review of literature lays the foundation for subsequent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the UK Governments *Policy Preventing and Reducing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia*. Developed principally in response to the economic impact of piracy occurring in Somali waters, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, the policy builds upon the

recommendations of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, and is compatible with Department for International Development (DFID) strategy. The analysis identifies two notable shifts in policy, and while overwhelmingly maritime focused, finds the policy provides a cogent and timely response to the wider endemic problems of Somalia.

Piracy

> It is likely that the disappearance [of the pirate] is permanent. It is hard to conceive that, even if our civilisation is overturned and lawlessness again becomes law, the pirate will emerge again (Gosse, 2007, p.298).

Originally writing in 1932, Gosse asserted that the demise of piracy was connected to the policing 'power of the modern state' adding that 'there seems very little chance for the enterprising individual to gain a living in this fashion' and lamented on how 'the passing of the pirate has taken some of the colour out the world' (Gosse, 2007, p.298). An interesting question to consider therefore is whether or not piracy ever did actually end.

Piracy has been reported throughout history alongside recorded accounts of trade and the transportation of goods (Gosse, 2007, p.1), it is defined by the UN as 'any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends . . . on the high seas' (UN, 1982, p.60-61). Yet, the reader may be forgiven for thinking like Gosse, of piracy as an anachronistic term, best consigned to the historical accounts of seventeenth-eighteenth century piracy exploits in the Caribbean; characterised by romantic images of the swashbuckler, the buccaneer or notorious figures such as Blackbeard and Captain Kidd, both of whom met with an ignominious end (See Kostam, 2008; or Little, 2010 for historical accounts of piracy including its *Golden Age*. Moreover, one of England's great Elizabethan hero's, Sir Francis Drake, was in effect a state sanctioned pirate, a 'privateer' sent forth during the reign of Elizabeth I of England to plunder at his monarchs' behest (Kostam, 2008 p.38-39). Nevertheless, despite such historical prominence, the phenomenon of piracy still exists, and arguably even more widespread – in Somali waters depredation at sea still occurs, only now acts of piracy are more likely to be conducted by speed boat than under sail.

Review of literature on the issue of Somali piracy

Historical context

Although there are several books on piracy, notwithstanding the aforementioned Kostam (2008) and Little (2010), in particular Colás and Mabee (2010) offer a good overview and historical contextualisation. Despite failing to provide practical solutions, their account of piracy and past confluence of state and non-state actors during the mercantile age, offer an interesting reflection on the arrival (or re-emergence) of non-state private security in response to the needs of merchant shipping, and its past and present relationship to naval warfare.

Naval response

For Osei-Tutu, the international naval response to piracy has not been an effective deterrent (Osei-Tutu, 2011, p.6) and similarly for Bueger, Stockbrügger and Werthes it reflects a narrow-minded strategy (Bueger, Stockbrügger and Werthes, 2011, p.357). Singh and Bedi show in their study, which they refer to as a 'War on Piracy', that while successful boarding's may have dropped between 2010 and 2011, the overall number of attacks increased (Singh and Bedi, 2012, p. 5). Thus, for Osei-Tutu Somali piracy cannot be resolved by a conventional maritime response, as the root causes are found ashore (Osei-Tutu, 2011, p.6).

Roots of Somali piracy

The roots of Somali piracy are identified by Osei-Tutu as stemming from not only illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign vessels, and the subsequent protective response by local fisherman in absence of state authority; but also that of high unemployment, low average income, drought, food security, political turmoil and internal displacement: failing to address these issues is argued by Osei-Tutu to perpetuate attraction to piracy (Osei-Tutu, 2011, p.13-14). This is in line with Singh and Bedi who argue that to break the cycle a response must be both developmental and governance based, not solely a deployment of force (Singh and Bedi, 2012, p.4). Neethling concurs, noting that states should ensure safe passage through their waters and therefore the solution must lie in securing good governance on land (Neethling, 2010, p.89).

Legality and prosecution

With absence of such governance, a number of writers have focused on legality and prosecution. The nationalities of crew, the ownership of vessels, the cargo and ship registration may be tied to different states, which leaves the question of who should pursue prosecution as somewhat vague (Osei-Tutu, 2011, p.7). Geiss and Petrig discuss directly the problem of legality and call for a 'reconceptualization of the traditional mechanisms of national law' towards a transnational model that can reach further than individual states (Geiss and Petrig, 2011, p.v). In sum, Geiss and Petrig draw the perhaps unsurprising conclusion that legal unambiguity is essential to combating piracy (Geiss and Petrig, 2011, p.224).

Islamic terrorism

Also evident within much of the literature is a linking of piracy to Islamic terrorism. Tsvetkova presents Somali piracy as facilitating a 'breeding ground for terrorists' (Tsvetkova, 2009, p.44). Likewise, Alexander and Richardson assert that maritime security faces its 'most serious threat' from al-Qaeda (Alexander and Richardson, 2009, p.xxxii). However, although Swart also posits the argument for the presence of 'a clear and present danger', he concedes rather contradictorily that actually there have been no 'major incidents' of 'maritime terrorism' connected to Somali piracy (Swart, 2009, p.65-66). The links being made between Somali piracy and Islamic terrorism are argued by Singh and Bedi (2012) as a mistaken conflation of two separate issues. Singh and Bedi present the connection between the 'War on Terror' and Somali piracy as fuelled by popular imagery of a maritime conflict being fought against Islamic groups such as al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda (Singh and Bedi, 2012, p.4). Furthermore, Bensassi argues Islamist terrorist groups are opposed to piracy due to its incompatibility with Shari'ah law, coupled with fear of escalated international countermeasures if seen to be connected to such groups (Bensassi, 2011, p.52). Moreover, media reports have included accounts of Islamic groups and pirates clashing over a seized oil tanker (the Sirius Star) on the basis of the ships (Muslim) ownership (Butcher, 2008, non-paginated). Although Murphy (2009) does not entirely repudiate the link between piracy and terrorism, he nonetheless asserts there are fundamental differences underpinning such groups, that of ideology and criminality: hence Murphy (2011) contends Somali piracy is profit motivated, not driven by ideology.

Analytical frameworks

There is limited examination of the topic from an analytical perspective. However, Singh and Bedi (2012), Tsvetkova (2009) and Bueger (2010) attempt to do so through the *securitization theory* of the Copenhagen School (See Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998). While Bueger (2010) focuses on the UN Security Council, alternatively Tsvetkova presents a coherent argument of 'securitization' being driven by the economy (Tsvetkova, 2009, p.44). Tsvetkova also finds that increased insurance and the re-routing of ships contributes to overall costs, eventually impacting on markets, state economies and consumers (Tsvetkova, 2009, p.54-55). Furthermore, Tsvetkova argues human security concerns are subordinate to increased costs of transporting oil to the West (Tsvetkova, 2009, p.44-45). Tsvetkova presents the capture of vessels such as the *Sirius Star*, laden with crude oil worth $100 million, as a key driver towards securitization (Tsvetkova, 2009, p.51). In contrast, Murphy repudiates such economic loss, contending that overall the commercial impact is 'miniscule' when set against annual global trade estimates of $7.8 trillion (Murphy, 2009, p.51).

The Copenhagen School approach adopted by these writers, rests on the concept of securitization that involves a presentation of threats disseminated from the top down, which once accepted by the public become legitimised as security issues, and subsequently allow elites to take action (Collins, 2010, p.6). The Copenhagen approach also argues for the returning of threats to the realm of day to day politics by way of a 'desecuritization' process (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998, p.29). But, it should be noted however, that not all within the realm of security studies share the theoretical perspective of the Copenhagen School, as despite their work being both influential and 'dynamic' (CASE Collective, 2006, p.452) the theoretical starting point for the main exponents of the Copenhagen approach (Buzan and Waever) are somewhat contradictory. For example, Waever starts from a post-structuralist stance while Buzan from a constructivist base, which leaves their work theoretically vulnerable and epistemologically incoherent (CASE Collective, 2006, p.452; Mutimer, 2010, p.91-92).

Academic community

One notable response from the academic community has been the online portal *Piracy Studies*, which aims to facilitate collaboration and dissemination of academic work on piracy and maritime security, to a broad range of stakeholders (See Piracy Studies, 2015). One particular aspect to emerge, is the adoption of the concept of 'maritime security' which effectively supersedes the previously

dominant terms such as 'sea power' or 'maritime terrorism' and now functions as an umbrella term (Stockbrügger and Bueger, 2014, non-paginated). Such concepts may prove useful to accommodate the often conflated issues of piracy and terrorism. Although, it is noticeable that the theoretical work of the Copenhagen School is prominent in the work of the lead academics. This is not necessarily problematic *per se*, but as discussed in the preceding *analytical frameworks* section, there are criticisms that can be directed at the theoretical underpinnings of the Copenhagen School approach to security studies. Nonetheless, *Piracy Studies* is a useful resource and should not be discounted solely on that basis.

Human cost

Inherent within the literature is a gap on social, cultural and political roots of both the problem and the solution to Somali piracy. Consequently, the main literature does little to addresses the vulnerability of the Somali population, and instead, as discussed in preceding sections, there is a clear preoccupation with the possibility of maritime terrorism and the global economic impact. While the human cost can clearly be found in the harrowing account of the Chandlers, Somali piracy is 'a simmering armed conflict that does not only threaten property, but also the life of seafarers, fishermen or people dependent on humanitarian aid' (Bueger, 2010, p.2). There is a need for further study on the human cost of Somali piracy and a fundamental need for both state and nation building and good governance in Somalia: piracy is a huge international problem but not the most salient Somalia faces.

Analysis of the UK Government response: Policy Preventing and Reducing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

The UK Government's policy development in response to Somali piracy must be understood not only against the economic background evident within the literature discussed in the preceding section, but also the fallout from the high profile kidnapping of the British couple, the Chandlers; subsequent criticism of the Royal Navy for not intervening, alleged British-Somali involvement (The Times, 2012, non-paginated) and a Somalia devoid of effective governance since the early 1990s – a period marked by US withdrawal (Besley, Fetzer and Mueller, 2013, non-paginated).

    The UK Government developed their anti-piracy policy following increased incidents during 2008, contending that the situation was detrimental to regional 'peace and security' (UK Government, 2012a, non-paginated). Such a spike

around 2008 is supported by Besley, Fetzer and Mueller (2013) in their analysis of the costs to shipping. The strategic (economic) importance of the region can be clearly found in the amount of shipping to Europe from Asia passing through the Gulf of Aden en-route to the Suez Canal (Besley, Fetzer and Mueller, 2013, non-paginated). The economic impact on trade in terms of additional shipping costs (ultimately borne by consumers) is estimated at 8% (Besley, Fetzer and Mueller, 2013, non-paginated). In response, the UK Governments policy approach is two pronged, it comprises both sea and land based elements of prevention and reduction.

Measures advocated in the policy include encouragement of mariners to use self-help measures, and the providing of a comprehensive list of useful contacts. The policy advises against non essential travel (particularly leisure yachts) within a prescribed area, with an emphasis on the need for merchants to follow industry best practice. The documents claim (of the UK leading the way) is substantiated through the UK's chairmanship of Working Group 1 of Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and participation in NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, which is the EU seaborne mission to which the UK contributes a Royal Navy Rear Admiral to the role of operational commander (EUNAVFOR, 2013, non-paginated) and the 2012 hosting of the first (since 1991) joint international and Somali conference (Aaran News, 2013, non-paginated).

Furthermore, evidence of UK engagement in piracy reduction can be found in UK participation in Operation Ocean Shield (NATO's Horn of Africa counter-piracy operation) which aims to 'Deter, disrupt and protect' (NSC, n.d., non-paginated). Similarly, the UK is a key member of Combined Task Force 151 tasked with 'global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations' (Royal Navy, n.d., non-paginated).

Policy shifts

here are two clear and significant policy shifts which can be found in a close examination of the policy. First, the policy supports prosecution of suspects (by regional partners Tanzania, Mauritius and the Seychelles) in an attempt to avoid the unpopular practice of capture and release (UK Government, 2012b, non-paginated). This shift in policy will have been welcome news for the shipping industry, having been highly critical of such release policies (gCaptain, 2012, non-paginated). Second, the policy supports deployment of 'armed guards' by private companies in order to provide a measure of 'self-protection' (UK Government, 2012a, non-paginated). Although increased insurance costs (including ransom and damage costs) are borne across the industry through higher premiums –

discounts are offered if private security is onboard (Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller, 2012, p.27). This particular shift in UK policy stems from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (of which much of this policy appears to rest on) which called for a strengthening of 'Vessel self-protection' through legislative adjustment of laws relating to private maritime security and the provision of 'Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel' (UK Parliament, 2011, p.4-5). However, the reason for such a change in policy may be principally economic: the UK cannot afford to deploy the Royal Navy indefinitely (Hopkins, 2012, non-paginated). The EU Atalanta mission alone for instance cost \$11 million during 2009 (Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller, 2012, p.25-26). Therefore, international cooperation is not solely about getting the job done effectively, it is about effectively sharing the financial burden.

Policy weaknesses

There are however, a number of criticisms which can be made of the UK *Policy Preventing and Reducing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia*. First, despite concern over the deployment of armed personnel onboard British flagged vessels in relation to rules of engagement and the level of permitted force (Sky News, 2012, non-paginated) a lucrative market has opened up for privateers such as Protection Vessels International (PVI). PVI offer a range of services, ranging from onboard protection (embarked security) to full vessel escorts crewed by ex-Royal Marines (PVI, n.d., non-paginated). Such policy however is problematic - Egypt has stated merchant ships transiting via the Suez Canal will not be permitted to carry armed personnel (BBC, 2011, non-paginated; Rickett, 2013, non-paginated) and the detainment of one PVI crew for alleged weapon possession in Eritrea, highlights further the problematic aspect of such a policy (Flood, 2011, non-paginated).

Second, the policy's preventative strategy comprising of development and humanitarian assistance is commendable but remiss in its detail of how or what it entails. The detail is found only through reading the Department for International Development (DFID) programme which the policy claims to support. Likewise, other than perusing the DFID document, there is no reference to improving governance or state building, which is central to the DFID strategy. DFID's programme carrying a £267 million budget, aims over a four year period to support peace building, governance, employment development, healthcare and overall humanitarian assistance (DFID, 2012, non-paginated).

Furthermore, such a sharp focus on piracy in the region of Somalia deflects attention from other areas of piracy and unrest. For example, as of 27 February 2013, there were a total of forty-four reported piracy attacks worldwide during

that year, which included three successful hijackings (ICC, 2013, non-paginated). Examination of attacks for the month of February 2013 listed by the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP) show that out of a total of sixteen incidents, seven occurred in West Africa (all in Nigeria except one incident off the Ivorian Coast) five in Indonesia, and one each in Vietnam, India and Bangladesh: only one incident was reported in Somali waters (MPHRP, 2013, non-paginated).

This begs the question of why there is still such focus on Somali piracy, particularly when organisations such as MPHRP claim that Nigeria is currently experiencing 'a dramatic increase in attacks' (MPHRP, 2013, non-paginated). Although there is less vulnerability in terms of shipping volume, crucially the answer lies in the fact that Nigeria is not a failed or hollow state: the Nigerian navy actively respond to piracy and related kidnappings in their territorial waters (Reuters, 2012, non-paginated). The key point, therefore, is that although Nigeria is experiencing increased activity, the stronger governance found in Nigeria compared to that of Somalia allows the Nigerian state to take the lead role in addressing maritime security issues. After all, as Neethling (2010) points out, it is the responsibility of states to ensure safe passage through their territorial waters. This underscores the vital importance for UK policy to help re-build the Somali state, in order for Somalia to secure her own territorial waters and subsequently allow international maritime forces to stand down.

Policy strengths

There are however, notable strengths inherent within the policy. First, there is recognition that the problem of Somalia and piracy cannot be solved only at sea. This is consistent with the findings of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that Somali piracy 'is a symptom of deep rooted instability on land' which failure to address will only allow piracy to 'continue to flourish' (FCO, 2010, non-paginated). With piracy having spawned from the endangered livelihood of Somali fishermen (Singh and Bedi, 2012, p.8) it is commendable that UK policy addresses this non-maritime aspect and need for not only governance and restoration of the rule of law, but also the fundamental need to build a sustainable livelihood for coastal communities.

Second, the policy's acknowledgement of a need for national 'peace building and reconciliation' (UK Government, 2012a, non-paginated) is a welcome inclusion (albeit not central to the policy) it is nonetheless a clear step towards a wider response as opposed to the previously dominant and narrow focus on 'deterrence, prosecution and military intervention' (Bueger, Stockbrügger, and

Werthes, 2011, p.358). Likewise, what currently exists of Somali governance, is also trying to reach out to those of influence within Somali society in an attempt to try and end the piracy cycle, including offering amnesty to young participants (Johnston, 2013, Non-paginated).

Finally, one notable and welcome absence is that of any reference to terrorism in the context of Somali piracy. Although other UK Government policy documents such as the UK National Security Strategy (2010) makes reference to Somalia several times in relation to terrorism – the absence of such references in *Policy Preventing and Reducing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia* is a welcome omission, as despite suggestions of Somali piracy as a facilitator of terrorism (Tsvetkova, 2009, p.44) it is a conflation of two separate issues (Singh and Bedi, 2012, p.4) connected only by one profiting from the other – just as any other terrorist organisation needs finance – economic links are not enough to fuse these disparate issues together.

Conclusions

Having reviewed the relevant literature on the issue of piracy in and around the territorial waters of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, which gave contextual background before the subsequent critique of the UK Governments policy response, it was shown that within the literature there is a clear preoccupation with the global economic impact and the possibility of Islamic terrorism. Consequently, the main literature does little to addresses the vulnerability of the Somali population. However, the literature does display a measure of consensus on the roots and solutions of Somali piracy being found ashore and the need for governance rather than solely the deployment of a maritime deterrent. Although the UK Government document *Policy Preventing and Reducing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia* could be enhanced by fuller detail without requiring the reader to search other policy documents; and despite a stronger emphasis placed on combating maritime piracy than tackling the underlying causes, and contentious policy of armed guards (illustrated by the cases of Egypt and Eritrea) nonetheless the policy's two pronged approach (prevention and reduction) and most notably its commitment to the DFID programme, confirms the policy as a an effective approach to tackle the underlying causes of Somali piracy – ultimately to curtail its practice, and at minimum, return control of policing Somali waters to a reconstituted Somali state.

Finally, following my research on this intriguing topic, I am concerned by the amount of literature on piracy in the context of maritime terrorism. Consequently, I am sympathetic to the argument that connecting piracy to terrorism (particularly

Islamic terrorism) is unfounded and a mistaken conflation. It is akin to suggesting that all acquisitive crime on land (in Somalia or elsewhere for that matter) is an act of terrorism – clearly it is not. Although certainly both acts could be aggravated by common factors such as a weak state, which is characteristic of Somalia, further scholarly work should question this conflation.

There is little doubt that a maritime strategy could be adopted by a terrorist group, and passenger cruise ships are one obvious vulnerable civilian target. But piracy in itself is not an act of terror underpinned by an ideology, it is an act for economic gain, in effect, whether opportunistic or planned, it is de facto depredation at sea. The motivations of the actors are different and require consequently different strategies and solutions: for example the controversial catch and release programme would hardly be welcome policy in combating terrorism. Therefore, I find that historical state sanctioned privateering aside, piracy now in Somalia and across the globe is intrinsically no different than found in the past, it was then and remains as before depredation at sea, not terrorism.

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The concept of vulnerability and its relationship to security: using the example of the ongoing conflict in Syria

Stephen Dillon*

Department of Social Policy and Intervention

At present, there seems no end in sight to the ongoing conflict in Syria. Despite normative assumptions of the state being responsible for protection of its own citizens, paradoxically state security can increase the vulnerability of sections of its own population. This paper highlights the most salient aspects of this extraordinary relationship between vulnerability and security in the context of Syria, and shows that a traditional state-centred (neorealist) approach to security, is insufficient to explain the full range of vulnerabilities experienced by those caught up in the ongoing Syrian conflict – a Human Security approach is a more valid analytical tool.

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*Email: stephen.dillon@new.ox.ac.uk

Introduction

Media headlines make reference to a 'Syria crisis', the 'Desperate plight of displaced civilians', 'Islamists versus secularists' and 'Turkey-Syria tensions' (BBC, 2012c, non-paginated). Normatively, the primary role of the state is to secure state territory and protect its own population. Paradoxically however, state security can actually increase the vulnerability of its own citizens. In this paper, I will explain this extraordinary relationship and how it can be seen clearly within the Syrian conflict. While this paper is not a narrative of the conflict, Syria is the context in which the paper begins by explaining both neorealist and human security approaches to security, and their associated definitions. This is followed by discussion of the key concept of vulnerability, firstly from a human perspective and secondly from the perspective of the state. In doing so, I will show the relationship between vulnerability, security and the state by briefly explaining each of them and how they are interconnected. Subsequently, I argue that a traditional state-centred (neorealist) approach to security is insufficient to explain the full range of vulnerabilities being experienced by those caught up in the ongoing Syrian conflict, and advocate the utilisation of a human security approach as a more useful analytical tool.

Realism

The dominant paradigm within traditional Security Studies remains that of Realism (Collins, 2010, p.2-5). This paper acknowledges that realism is not homogenous; it diverges in terms of classical, postclassical and neorealist forms (Brooks, 1997, p.445-446). However, for the purposes of this paper and to maintain clarity, the basic tenets of the paradigm will be employed as presented by neorealists such as Waltz (Brooks, 1997, p.445).

Crucial to understanding neorealism is the assertion made by Waltz that the international system in essence is anarchic (Waltz, 1979, p.34-35). Neorealists define security as that which is required to secure the state, militarily if necessary (McLean and McMillan, 2009, p.453). Therefore, what is clear from this definition is that the state is the referent object – that which is to be secured. Concerns over domestic (low) politics are of little concern to neorealists who instead place international (high) politics as pre-eminent: for neorealists high politics is security (Hobson, 2000, p.2). Realism therefore is state-centric and explains state behaviour as being driven by national interest (Brooks, 1997, p.449), the interests of the state are paramount and subsequently security is framed within such parameters (Wendt, 1992, p.392). But therein lies the problematic

aspect of a neorealist approach in understanding the current vulnerability of Syrians – its dismissal of domestic politics (Brooks, 1997, p.471).

A Human Security approach

Despite the dominance of the traditional state centred (military) concept of security, a shift has occurred whereby the referent object has become that of people through the development of a Human Security approach[1]. A convergence between International Relations (IR) and Political Science, affected a degree of overlap between IR and Security Studies which consequently generated new concepts, approaches and contested definitions of what is security (Collins, 2010, p.2). Primarily, the arrival of Critical Security Studies (CSS) shifted the breadth of security to include multiple referent objects rather than a singular (state-centric) referent object (Mutimer, 2010, p.86)[2].

This shift in how security is considered, has led to it being in terms of human security, a normative concept entwined particularly with Western societal values (Brauch, et al., 2011, p.61). The role of the United Nations (UN) has been fundamental in contributing towards the evolution of human security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.121) and accordingly it now sits within the UN's notion of entitlement to a 'larger freedom' which also incorporates development and human rights (Annan, 2005, p.5).

However, there are no shortage of opinions and definitions of what actually constitutes human security (King and Murray, 2001, p.585).[3] As the confines of this paper cannot accommodate an in-depth discussion of these variations, to retain focus I apply the definition of human security as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The UNDP define human security as 'embedded in a notion of solidarity among people' with 'safety from chronic threats ... and repression' together with 'protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life' (UNDP, 1994, p.23-24). Additionally, 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' are the two central components of human security amidst a wide range of threat typology which includes both political and community security (UNDP, 1994, p.24-25). Recognition of these wider aspects of what contemporary security

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[1] It should be noted that Human Security has been conceptually widened. Tanaka (2015) presents a useful discussion on the fields' relationship with wider aspects including economic, development, human rights, health, political, and environmental dimensions.

[2] Although much of the alternatives to neorealism have been criticised by Krause and Williams as devoid of any 'explanatory framework' (Krause and Williams, 1996, p.230).

[3] Alkire (2003) provides a rich discussion on Human Security including its varied definitions.

entails have also been formerly codified by some Western states: Germany for example includes environmental and economic vulnerabilities but also 'political and societal instabilities' (Brauch et al., 2011, p.64). This is compatible with UNDP definitions of freedom from (political) want. However, any discussion of security would be incomplete without inclusion of its counterpart – vulnerability.

Vunerability

The concept of human security is inseparable from the concepts of vulnerability and risk (Shabaz, 2008, p.1). Although risk increases the 'probability of harmful consequences' (UNISDR, 2008, p.5) what constitutes vulnerability (and risk) has changed in tandem with the wider and deeper definitions of security developed since the end of the Cold War (Brauch et al., 2011, p.94). Vulnerability has been defined in a number of ways relating to specific areas such as global, environmental, climatic and hazard, which effectively change the conceptual meaning (Brauch et al., 2011, p.67-78). For the purposes of this paper, vulnerability will be framed within a political and societal context. In these terms, vulnerability is an increased susceptibility of exposure to harm, either physically or emotionally (Brauch et al., 2011, p.67). The Syrian population are currently vulnerable due to their exposure to major risk – civil war.

Human perspective

By its very nature, war increases vulnerability (Brauch et al., 2011, p.69). Civil war can not only bring loss of life but also destruction of property and population displacement. Property loss and displacement can in turn impact on the livelihood of a household, effecting an additional socio-economic vulnerability (UNISDR, 2008, p9-10) with damaged homes leaving civilian populations exposed during winter. With some civilians having been displaced more than once (BBC, 2012c, non-paginated), estimates of displaced persons are reported to have reached over 11.5 million.[4] Some internally displaced persons (IDPs) reportedly face an additional burden of vulnerability through fear of providing their name to register for official aid, instead relying on charitable and community aid (BBC, 2012c, non-paginated).

However, vulnerability is not one dimensional, it is important therefore to clarify at which level vulnerability is being discussed; at the wider global

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[4]This figure is based on US Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit estimates of 3.9 million refugees from Syria in neighbouring states in addition to 7.6 million internally displaced persons remaining in Syria (HIU, 2015, non-paginated).

level, societal, individual, group or state: similarly, the subjective nature and relationality of vulnerability means that even within such categories, vulnerability can vary greatly (Nathan, 2009, cited in Brauch et al., 2011, p.68). In geographical terms the risk of vulnerability may not be equitable either within or between communities (UNISDR, 2008, p.10). For example, in the capital Damascus despite the ongoing conflict, for Alawite communities in the eastern parts of the city reportedly life 'carries on as normal' (BBC, 2012a, non-paginated).[5]

Wilches-Chaux offers a typology of vulnerability which includes social and political dimensions (Wilches-Chaux, 1989, cited in Brauch et al., 2011, p.68) but there can also be a 'structural vulnerability' in the sense of a lack of political influence or inclusion (UNISDR, 2008, p.10). This can be found in Syria with the example of the Kurdish minority, who are estimated to comprise ten percent of the overall Syrian population, but many remained stateless up until the reforms of 2011 and previously deprived of citizenship (Muscati, 2012, non-paginated). Therefore at the societal level, vulnerability is experienced through being 'politically powerless' (O'Riordan, 2002, p.369). As the Kurdish and Alawite examples highlight, exposure to vulnerability varies across and within the Syrian population.

However, in a wider context, the interconnectivity of globalisation and inter-reliance has led to what Nef has described as 'mutual vulnerability' (Nef, 1999, p.vi) in other words, what happens in Syria may have global consequences.[6] Even at the regional level, the inter-faith and sectarian tensions of Syria have flared up in neighbouring Lebanon (BBC, 2012b, non-paginated).[7]

Despite UN assertions that 'mass violence obliges the international community to be more vigilant … When prevention fails, there is urgent need to stop the killing' (UN, 2004, p.34) there has been no intervention.[8] Consequently, segments of the Syrian population already made vulnerable by the state, have been left further vulnerable by the international community. Additionally, the

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[5]The Alawis are a minority group who have risen from a position of persecution and discrimination in Syria to that of the dominant political force. The situation in Syria is complicated by the diversity of the Syrian population, with religiously defined groups including Druze, Isma'ili, Christian and the majority Sunni population, for whom religion is central to identity (Faksh, 1984. p.138).

[6]The West fears a 'jihadist takeover and Syria's transformation into a terrorist incubator' (Chatham House, 2014, p.9) in other words from a Western perspective, insecurity in Syria equates to insecurity in the West.

[7]'Syria's conflict has the potential to be particularly damaging across the region because it is exacerbating existing political and sectarian cleavages in neighbouring countries' (Chatham House, 2014, p.2).

[8]'… there is no political appetite in the West for military intervention' (Chatham House, 2014, p.6). Furthermore 'The [US] Administration and its allies all have ruled out deploying combat forces to either Iraq or Syria' (Katzman, 2014, non-paginated)

International Rescue Committee has identified that among Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, women and girls are in particular 'vulnerable to exploitation and violence' especially rape both within Syria and as refugees (Colt, 2012, non-paginated).[9]

State perspective

Fundamentally, human security 'attempts to address critical questions about who is secure, who is not, and whose interests are served' (Muthien, 2000, p.49-50). What is to be secured and from what, will vary significantly depending on whether a state-centred 'national security' approach is followed or that of a 'human security' approach (Brauch et al., 2011, p.62). What matters foremost, is how threat, risk and vulnerability are perceived, either objectively or subjectively (Brauch et al., 2011, p.61-62). For instance, a regime may view public demonstration as a threat to the state, whereas those caught up in the milieu may see the state response as a threat in itself.

The perception of threat by a state leads to state insecurity, which results in a response setting 'the agenda for national security' (Buzan, 1983, p.88). In Syria the state can be seen as vulnerable, in particular the security of the regime, which responds militarily to perceived threats.[10] Securitization (a process highlighted by the Copenhagen School) suggests elites are able to legitimise military action by gaining public acquiescence through presenting issues as threats to national security (Collins, 2010, p.6).[11] Such a process was evident retrospectively considering Western action in Iraq in 2003 (Jolly and Ray, 2006, p.5).

Therefore, control of the media is a powerful tool, the Syrian state media organisation is the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) (SANA, 2012a, non-paginated). Attempts at securitization by the Syrian state are evident by their

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[9]'Syrian refugees are having the greatest impact on Lebanon, where they now constitute around a quarter of the country's population' (Chatham House, 2014, p.7); now totalling 1,196,560 (HIU, 2015, non-paginated).

[10]Although a separate discussion, it is noted that some commentators may view the current conflict as a fight for survival of the core of the regime and its allies against a Sunni majority, rather than a clear cut matter of 'national security'. The author is not unsympathetic to such a view, although, with the advent of Islamic State (IS), the Syrian state, the nation and Syrian culture now face an existential threat.

[11]The Copenhagen School, principally the work of Waever, Buzan and de Wilde, presented a pluralist approach to the study of security through the concept of multisectors comprising the societal, political, economic, environmental and military sectors, in effect theoretically bridging the gap between traditional realist thought and the new emerging approaches reflecting contemporary security concerns (Prezelj, 2008, p.3). The group later reconceptualised the societal aspect as a referent in its own right rather than simply a component of state security, in effect societal security was posited to be held in a duality with the state (Roe, 2010, p.203-204).

use of 'terrorists' in SANA broadcasts (SANA, 2012b, non-paginated). Such language may serve to change public perception and amplify the sense of risk (Brauch et al., 2011, p.84). From the perspective of the state, they may be referring to non-state actors who have entered the fray without any concern for 'national interests' (Brauch et al., 2011, p.85) and labelled as 'foreign mercenaries' (SANA, 2012c, non-paginated). Reports from Western sources support these assertions, identifying the presence of foreign Islamic fighters, adding fuel to the already tense Islamic-secular cleavage (Sinjab, 2012, non-paginated).[12]

Although the UN recognises that 'it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples' (UN, 2004, p.1), the Syrian state repudiates accusations of cluster bomb deployment, although Human Rights Watch organisation claim to have documented their use and impact on civilian populations (HRW, 2012, non-paginated). By such action, the Syrian state increase the risk to their own citizens by placing in jeopardy civilian security, and increase the vulnerability of their own citizens.[13]

When applying the UNDP definitions of freedom from (political) want to the case of Syria, there has been extant political want in Syria since the ascent of the Ba'ath party following the coups d'tat of 1963 (Rabbani, 2011, p.258).[14] The events of 2011 which triggered the current conflict were another chapter in a long line of disaffection with Syrian regimes (UNHCR, 2012, non-paginated). While a state-centred approach may focus on regime response, from a human security perspective such demonstrations were a clear example of political want – however, political want has now given way to a clear lack of freedom from fear. Therefore, using the UNDP definition in this manner allows vulnerabilities within Syria to be highlighted, both those which existed prior to the conflict and those presently experienced emanating from the conflict.

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[12]There is growing concern among Western governments as to the strength of 'Islamist extremist groups and the possibility of terrorist attacks emanating from Syria' which would necessitate a return to dealing with Assad and in effect legitimise the regime – albeit intelligence channels will already be open (Chatham House, 2014, p.6). Currently the most significant such group is the Islamic State (IS) described by US officials as a 'transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group' and operating in Syria since 2013 (Katzman et al., 2014, p.1).

[13]The question of regime change is a central aspect: although a complete collapse of the Syrian state is not in the best interests of Western powers, who along with the Gulf states support regime change: for Russia and Iran this is only acceptable by way of elections (Chatham House, 2014, p.9).

[14]See Maoz and Yaniv (1986) for an account of the historical rise of the Assad regime and the modern Syrian state and its position in the region.

Prognosis

Is there an end to the tragic events in Syria?[15] The case for a humanitarian based military intervention may save lives in the short term (Collins, 2010, p.359). However, dealing with the aftermath of any military intervention must include learning lessons from the 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein, that strategic planning must include a 'human security framework' (Jolly and Ray, 2006, p.5). Nonetheless, regardless of the strength of any interventionist argument on the grounds of humanitarian need, a traditional military response would not solve the underlying tensions and existing social divisions (Tadjbakhsh, 2008, non-paginated). At present there is no end in sight, with post conflict tensions likely to remain long after formal cessation of violence: the outlook is bleak if regional comparison is made with neighbouring Lebanon which still experiences violence two decades after its own protracted civil war (CIA, 2012, non-paginated; Al Jazeera, 2012, non-paginated).

An optimistic glimmer of hope could lie within the power of symbolism. For example, the opposition use an older version of the Syrian flag which symbolises their enmity towards the current regime (Mahmud, 2012, non-paginated). If either side (state or opposition) could demonstrate desire for ethnic and secular equality by incorporating shared symbols into one unifying flag, then perhaps the Syrian people can find a tangible symbol and expression of solidarity with one another.[16]

Conclusion

During the research on this topic, it was evident that there is a substantial source of literature focused on vulnerability related to development, the environment and hazard risk. There was however less available on security related vulnerabilities in relation to conflict, which highlights an area for further study.

This paper has not sought to take sides or offer a narrative of the Syrian conflict and has been necessarily constrained in what depth of detail and issues it could accommodate. Nonetheless, I have highlighted the most salient aspects concerning the relationship between vulnerability and security in the context of Syria.

It has been shown that despite the normative assumption of states being responsible for the protection of their own citizens, paradoxically state security

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[15]Although not with the same intensity, conflict experts predict that the 'Syrian war will last 8–15 years' (Chatham House, 2014, p.6).

[16]The symbolic power of flags has been utilised by Islamic State (IS). Their chosen symbol resonates in the Middle East because of its choice of colour, script and calligraphy (Prusher, 2014, non-paginated).

is increasing the vulnerability of segments of the Syrian population. This paper has demonstrated this extraordinary relationship by presenting both the neorealist and human security approaches in the context of the socio-political climate of Syria. It was shown by looking at the states own perspective and vulnerability, that the security response (such as alleged use of cluster bombs) directly impacts on the vulnerability and risk experienced by some Syrian citizens. The aspect of relationality was also revealed by examining the impact on sections of Syrian society such as the Kurdish minority, Alawis, women and the general population of how vulnerability is experienced disproportionately both between and within groups. Interpretation and application of the UNDP definition and concepts highlighted vulnerabilities both before the conflict and currently, by identifying the shift from an absence of freedom from want (in a political sense) to a lack of freedom from fear. It is therefore clear from this discussion that examination of the Syrian conflict through a neorealist lens, focusing merely on the state and offering only a military solution, is insufficient to highlight the vulnerability experienced by a diverse Syrian population: a human security framework incorporating wider aspects of contemporary security is a more valid analytical tool for scrutiny of the paradoxical relationship between state security and vulnerability.

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The Boulezian Work-Concept

Nicholas Goode*

Department of Music

Throughout the twentieth century, ideas and ideologies surrounding openness and flexibility have both inspired and frustrated artists, writers, and musicians. In this essay, the writings and music of Pierre Boulez are examined in order to describe an alternative perspective of openness that motivates his practices. By close reading of his compositions and theoretical writings, the genealogy of his theories of openness is traced from the 1950s to the present day. It is found that unlike his contemporaries who typically destabilised musical materials, Boulez situates openness at the level of the work-concept itself, thus imagining a radically different conceptualisation of music.

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*Email: Nicholas.Goode@new.ox.ac.uk

Introduction

> "Let us claim for music the right to parentheses and italics...a concept
> of discontinuous time made up of structures which interlock instead of
> remaining in airtight compartments, and finally a sort of development
> where the closed circuit is not the only possible answer."
>
> <div align="right">Pierre Boulez[1]</div>

After the Second World War, many circles of the musical avant-garde attempted
to break with the conventions of the Western art music tradition by radically
reassessing the ways in which music could be composed and performed. The
search for an alternative to experiencing works as fixed, static musical objects
was a significant subplot in the quest for new musical expressions. Musicians
on both sides of the Atlantic theorised and composed music that attempted to
subvert the ideals of finality and closure exemplified above all by Beethoven's
symphonies. Instead of writing music that would sound virtually the same at every
performance, composers began to explore ideas of 'openness' in their musical
materials and forms. They employed various means to do this: for example by
enabling the performer to make choices, or by introducing chance procedures into
their pieces. A first, basic definition of openness in music might therefore refer
to its unfixed and dynamic formal or structural properties, such that the music's
sound-structures cannot be essentialised under a prescriptive notation.[2]

What are the aesthetic and practical consequences of describing a musical
work as 'open'? The writings and compositions of Pierre Boulez make a
particularly interesting case study for investigating theories of openness in
music. Throughout his career as a composer, performer, and director of various
musical institutions, he has continually strived to redefine musical practice as a
fundamentally open activity. His works from the 1970s onwards are frequently
and drastically revised, withdrawn, or are explicitly derived from previous
materials. The destabilisation of the musical work that is evident in his theories
and practices potentially challenges the Romantic work-concept that is described
by Lydia Goehr in her book *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*.

The terms 'musical work' and 'work-concept' were brought to critical
attention and popularised by Goehr's book. Their meanings are distinct but
intertwined. Whilst both are concerned with the production of music, the

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[1] 'Current Investigations', in *Stocktakings from an Apprenticeship*, trans. Stephen Walsh, ed. Paule
Thévenin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 19.

[2] John Dack succinctly summarises the musical responses to the openness during this period in 'The
Electroacoustic Music of Henri Pousseur and the "Open" Form', in Björn Heile, ed., *The Modernist
Legacy: Essays on New Music* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 78–80.

musical work generally refers to any musical *object* whether real or imagined (a Beethoven symphony, for example), whereas the work-concept is the complex of ideologies, practices, and social conditions under which the work is produced. Goehr's central claim is that the work-concept materialised in musical practice at the turn of the nineteenth century: thus Beethoven would have thought of his music in terms of autonomous works – that is, musical objects – whereas Bach would not. He may instead have thought of his music as an accompaniment to worship, for example.

Goehr has argued that many of the post-war avant-garde's theoretical challenges to the work-concept actually strengthened it, rather than diminishing it. Whilst their musical materials and forms may have experimented with openness, in practice they were producing works that relied on the concept's institutional conventions of concert performance and *Werktreue* (or 'fidelity to the work') in order to make their performances possible.[3] In this essay I examine Boulez's body of writing and music in order to describe an alternative perspective of the openness that motivates his practices. I argue that Boulez's interpretation of the musical work-concept goes beyond the materialist concerns of his contemporaries by situating openness at the level of the concept itself, and by making the work subservient to 'musical form', rather than the other way around. By taking a close reading of Boulez's writings and practices, I hope to provide an interpretation of his aesthetics that furthers appreciation of his music and thought.

Boulez: a musical physiognomy

Boulez is concerned with how theory relates to practice in such a way that one has shaped the other in his work. His prolific writings, lectures, and thoughts about music have been published during almost every period of his creative life, and often reflect on the practicalities of composing and performing his own music.[4] As a young *enfant terrible* of the post-war avant-garde, his journal articles served to spread his ideas about contemporary music and his own fiery reputation as a polemicist. His book *Penser la musique aujourd'hui* (1960)[5] signals a change of direction following the launch of his conducting career in the late 1950s. Boulez becomes more concerned with the audiences at his performances, and begins to

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[3] *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (rev. ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 260–265.

[4] For a partial but recent bibliography see Jonathan Goldman, *The Musical Language of Pierre Boulez: Writings and Compositions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 218–9

[5] In English translation as *Boulez on Music Today*, trans. Susan Bradshaw and Richard Rodney Bennett (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

consider how his own compositions might be composed so as to connect with listeners. His appointment to the Collège de France from 1976 to 1995 spawned a series of important public lectures that reflect on all manner of issues surrounding musical life.[6] The volume and breadth of Boulez's theoretical output allows us to connect his thoughts about music directly to his practices as composer, performer, and critic of his music.

Early experiments

The experiments of chance, indeterminacy, and open form that Goehr critiques at the end of *The Imaginary Museum* were also of significant interest to Boulez. Boulez had kept a correspondence with Cage during the early 1950s, and later published his own assessment of the prospects of aleatoric music.[7] Elements of indeterminacy and performer choice in Boulez's compositions from this period reflect 'the legitimate wish to construct a kind of labyrinth with a number of paths',[8] but by situating this sort of openness at the level of performance as Boulez was doing, the music was still essentially bounded by the space of the musical work. I shall argue that Boulez's project to design 'a sort of development where the closed circuit is not the only possible answer'[9] was only realised in his later compositions where the work itself is treated as a fragment of, or a window onto the larger musical form, rather than an end in itself.

In a 1983 lecture, Boulez described the famous 'mosaic'-like form of Stravinsky's *Symphonies of Wind Instruments* (1920) as being 'various developments at different stages of their evolution'. Boulez's fascination with the structure of musical time is well-documented in his own writings, and his earliest attempts to disrupt the linear progression of a 'development' sometimes resemble Stravinsky's own 'network of trajectories whose intersections are assured by their own articulation.'[10] For example, in *Le Marteau sans maître* (1952–5), three poems of René Char and their instrumental elaborations are placed within interlocking cycles in a way that mirrors Stravinsky's 'stratification' of materials in the *Symphonies*. Boulez, like Stravinsky before him, arguably creates in *Le Marteau* a multiplicity of interpenetrating musical developments within the form of the work: temporality is experienced at the level of each movement,

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[6] Published as *Points de repère III: Leçons de musique*, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 2005). Regrettably this volume has not yet been translated into English.

[7] *The Boulez–Cage Correspondence*, trans. Robert Samuels, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); 'Alea', in *Stocktakings*, 26–38.

[8] Boulez, 'Alea', 29.

[9] Boulez, 'Current Investigations', 19.

[10] Quoted in and trans. Goldman, *The Musical Language of Pierre Boulez*, 74.

each poem-cycle, and across the whole performance. However, this is achieved within the boundaries of a closed approach to the work itself: the composition is sealed and, like a Beethoven symphony, its notes and structure are forever fixed. Subsequent compositions including the second book of *Structures* (1956/1961), *Éclat* (1965), and *Domaines* (1961–8) would adopt 'mobile trajectories' and controlled experiments in notation in an attempt to release the work from a single sounding identity in its performances.

The 'work-in-progress'

The best-known of these experiments is undoubtedly Boulez's Third Piano Sonata (1955–7; 1963–). In 1960, Boulez published "'Sonate, que me veux-tu?'", an article describing both the projected form of the piece as well as his motivations for writing it. In it, he explicitly identifies the traditional concept of the work as a limit which he aims to transcend: by analogy with a Euclidean straight line, 'a work is *one*, a single object of contemplation or delectation, which the listener finds in front of him and in relation to which he takes up his position'. By contrast, and following the literary examples of Joyce and Mallarmé, Boulez is attempting to '[master] a subject by reconstructing it in all directions, including the reverse of temporal succession'.[11] Thus, the description of the sonata highlights the extraordinary degree of mobility and suppleness that Boulez intends his music to possess.

Each of the sonata's five movements or 'formants' may act as the start or end point of a performance (except the third, *Constellation*, or its retrograde version, *Constellation-Miroir*). The performer is presented with choices in moving from one formant to the next, but these are ultimately governed by an overarching structure. Meanwhile, each formant itself can be played in different ways according to the performer's decisions: *Constellation* may be played in retrograde form as *Constellation-Miroir*; in *Strophe* 'the pagination of each strophe is mobile, independent of all the others'; *Trope* employs a circular form with no set beginning or end point; and so on. Thus a single performance of the sonata presents the pianist with a panoply of choices which might be decided spontaneously. After Joyce, Boulez himself considers the sonata a 'work in progress', in the sense that, unlike a Beethoven sonata, it cannot be reduced to the score because the notation does not prescribe a single sounding identity in

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[11]Quoting Jacques Scherer's essay on Mallarmé's *Livre* in "'Sonate, que me veux-tu?'", in *Orientations*, trans. Martin Cooper, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 147.

performance.[12]

The Third Sonata is also a 'work in progress' in a more pragmatic sense. Although Boulez gave a performance of it in an early version in 1958, the piece remains incomplete. Only two of the formants have been published (*Trope* and *Constellation-Miroir*), and the others have yet to be completed.[13] The suggestion that the work may remain unfinished raises interesting questions about its ontological status. As a work that is fundamentally open in its being incomplete as well in its internal dynamics, the Third Sonata can be viewed in contrasting perspectives. Arguably, Boulez has failed in his aim to create a work that lives outside of the work-concept, because as soon it is finished or 'sealed' it will be prey to the same manifestations of *Werktreue* that Goehr sees in Cage's 4' 33". On the other hand, by publishing some (but not all) of a work that relies on a rigorous and active communication between its local and global structures to generate its sounding form, Boulez is pulling the rug from under his own composition. *Werktreue* or 'fidelity to the work' thus becomes an unattainable and irrelevant notion. Significantly, Boulez has indeed performed and recorded several of his 'in progress' compositions from the 1960s, and has sanctioned 'provisional' publications in the same manner. These bear witness to a change in his practices which begin to destabilise prior conceptions of the open work and the work-concept itself.

Boulez makes remarks in "'Sonate, que me veux-tu?"' that would seem to predict the shape of his work to come: 'I find the concept of works as independent fragments increasingly alien, and I have a marked preference for large structural groups centred on a cluster of determinate possibilities'.[14] The article and its musings are concerned with the Third Sonata, but its ambitions and theories only begin to be satisfactorily realised over a decade later. After the experiments of the 1960s with openness in performance, in the 1970s Boulez begins to approach the concept of the work itself as an open, unfixed way of structuring a composition: 'For my own part I always consider a work as something essentially ambiguous ... What really interests me (and it is there that actual form may give a work its maximum effectiveness) is a work that contains a strong element of ambiguity and therefore permits a number of different meanings or solutions.'[15]

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[12] "'Sonate"', 148. This reasoning brings the Third Sonata into a close alliance with the definition of openness described at the beginning of this essay.

[13] Boulez, '... "ouvert", encore ...', *Contemporary Music Review*, 26/3–4 (June/August 2007), 340.

[14] "'Sonate"', 148.

[15] 'Where Are We Now?', in *Orientations*, 462.

Mature practices

In compositional practice, the manifestation of multiple solutions has taken several different but related shapes. In some pieces, such as the piano piece *Incises* (1994; 2001), these take the form of significantly different 'versions' that evolve through a working-out of musical materials over time. *Incises* was originally a short piece commissioned for the Umberto Micheli Piano Competition in Milan in 1994, yet its materials were thoroughly worked-over to produce Sur *Incises* (1996–8) for three pianos, three harps, and three percussionists, which lasts over half an hour. The products of this 'commentary' were then distilled back into the original piano piece; in Jonathan Goldman's words 'the idea (*Incises*) gives rise to a realization (Sur *Incises*) which is then "retrofitted" back onto *Incises*'.[16]

Whilst *Incises* succinctly demonstrates the malleability of the work in Boulez's hands, it is by no means the most extreme example of a flexible approach to the work-concept. In 1972, Boulez published a short tribute to Stravinsky in *Tempo* magazine titled ...*explosante-fixe*...which presented two pages of musical materials and detailed instructions for their realisation.[17] Over the following decades, this short 'DIY performance kit' spawned a complex genealogy of realisations, versions, and offspring in multiple media and states of completion. Boulez performed several realisations of the piece before it received a substantial reworking for ensemble and electronics, premiered at the Proms in 1973 and immediately withdrawn.[18] Much later, *Mémoriale* (...*explosante-fixe...Originel*) (1985) adorned one of the original parts for solo flute with a small ensemble; this in turn was grafted into the conclusion of the half-hour ...*explosante-fixe*...(1991–3) for MIDI flute, two solo flutes, ensemble and electronics. Aside from the continuing metamorphoses of ...*explosante-fixe*...itself, its musical materials have given rise to a whole extended family of works including *Rituel in memoriam Maderna* (1974–5), *Anthèmes* (1991–2) and its progeny *Anthèmes II*, as well as various incidental and occasional compositions.[19]

With ...*explosante-fixe*..., the work-concept is subordinated to a higher principle of formal organisation. To realise the musical form implicit in a work's materials is now the ultimate goal of composition. This takes the shape of 'a form which is not fixed, an evolving form which rebels against its own repetition; in short, a relative formal virtuality', to recapitulate the words Boulez once used

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[16]*The Musical Language of Pierre Boulez*, 175.

[17]'In Memoriam: Igor Stravinsky. Canons & Epitaphs, Set 2', supplement to *Tempo*, 98 (1972).

[18]Susan Bradshaw, 'Comparing Notes', *The Musical Times*, 137/1844 (October 1996), 5–12.

[19]*The Musical Language of Pierre Boulez*, 101–2.

to describe the labyrinthine ideal he was fruitlessly searching for in the 1950s.[20] When the form of the music is recognised as a virtual entity rather than something fixed by the work-concept, the work is no longer acting as an autonomous object, but exists as a fragment of or window onto that musical form.

The notion of the virtual invokes the writings of Gilles Deleuze, who often refers to Boulez's music in his later work. Deleuze himself seized the opportunity for reflecting on music and temporality that Boulez's ideas present. In a 1986 essay, Deleuze discusses the Boulezian notion of *fixes*, which refer to

> a third milieu, a third space-time *adjacent* to those of the smooth and the striated,[21] charged with making writing perceptible: the universe of Fixed Elements [*Fixes*] . . . which is presented in the manner of a *gesture* levelling out the formal structure, or an envelope isolating a group of constitutive elements. The relation of envelopes among themselves creates the richness of perception and awakens sensibility and memory.

Deleuze highlights the idea that *fixes* are not autonomous and self-substantiating, but instead rely on their relation to each other and to a virtual idea of a complete structure which is never fully apparent.

> One should not think that involuntary memory or fixed elements re-establish a principle of identity. . . . Even in repetition, the fixed element is not defined by the identity of an element that is repeated, but by a *quality common* to the elements which could not be repeated without it. . . . The fixed element is not the Same, and does not discover an identity beneath the variation, quite the opposite. It will allow one to *identify* the variation, which is to say the variations in the striated milieu, and the distributors in the smooth milieu. . . . [T]he fixed elements do not imply any permanence, but rather *instantaneize* [*instantanéisent*] the variation or dissemination that they force us to perceive.[22]

Fixes are therefore an instructive way to think about the Boulezian musical work. Rather than substantiating their own autonomous and closed identities, works constitute provisional 'variations' of the evolving musical form which are always ready to fold back into the formal fabric. In this way the previous, withdrawn, and successive versions and offspring of . . . *explosante-fixe*. . . or *Incises* illuminate Boulez's comments that 'Such a project, or series of projects, I suppose, could be traced back to a broader interpretation of "open form". Now each work itself

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[20]'Alea', 29.

[21]The opposition of smooth and striated time here refers to Boulez's own theories of musical temporality as elaborated in *Boulez on Music Today*.

[22]'Boulez, Proust and Time: "Occupying without Counting"', trans. Timothy S. Murphy, *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 3/2 (1998), 72.

is "open" for other works to develop from the original's basic premise. ... Now "open form" could well symbolise my view of composition itself, with the "form" – that is, each work – being "open" to revisions, reevaluations, reconsiderations ... '.[23]

Boulez's compositional profile, then, traces the development of a highly idiosyncratic approach to openness in music. The experiments of the later 1950s and 1960s aimed to resist the Beethovenian notion of closure and finitude through the use of 'mobile trajectories' and directed choices in performance. In this way Boulez was attempting to integrate the simultaneous developments and temporalities of *Le Marteau* at a material level of musical form, realised in the moment of performance. The attempt failed, however, insofar as it yielded results that were 'utopian' and unrealistic in practice or that were simply unsatisfactory.[24] It is only when the notion of openness is raised to the power of the work-concept itself, over and above the fixed musical work, that pragmatic and satisfying solutions are produced.

In practice this reorganization and privileging of openness has led to diverse 'lineages' and histories of compositions, but it has also prompted Boulez to advocate for a change in the structure of musical institutions, buildings, practices, and so on. Boulez argues that the infrastructure of art music in the West is not fit for the requirements of its contemporary culture. There is a necessity to view orchestras and concert halls not as the ends of a musical tradition but as open, *ad hoc* resources that serve to realise and further the development of contemporary musical culture. The notion of openness and flexibility that informs Boulez's music thus extends itself to his view of the cultural landscape and its institutions.[25] In Boulez's own practice this has most obviously been realised with the founding of the Institute de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique (IRCAM) at the Pompidou Centre in Paris in 1977, which he directed until 1992. The associated Ensemble InterContemporain, founded by Boulez in 1976, is a salient example of Boulez's efforts to reorganise and administrate the contemporary music ensemble on the principle of openness and flexibility. Meanwhile, during the planning of the Parisian Opéra de la Bastille in 1984, Boulez attempted 'to create a flexible hall, a Salle Modulaire, which would be mobile and which could give us the architectural conditions to experience opera without the heavy

[23] '..."ouvert", encore ... ', 340.
[24] '..."ouvert", encore ... ', 340.
[25] Boulez explicitly connects his ideas and experiences of openness in writing and performing music with the need for a renewed, flexible approach to the infrastructure of Western art music in 'Where Are We Now?', 445–63. See also the collection of writings headed 'Composer and Audience' in *Orientations*, 445–94, especially 'The Bauhaus Model' and 'Orchestras, Concert Halls, Repertory, Audiences'.

machinery of old opera houses, and would encourage new forms through the flexibility of the space'.[26] Such activities are representative of an attitude towards reformation of musical practice that privileges openness, mobility, and provisional rather than permanent outcomes.[27]

Neutralising the work-concept

Boulez's approach raises a host of questions about the ontology, aesthetics, and epistemology of the musical work. The implications are as numerous and significant as to warrant their own space for discussion. Rather than attempt to address those questions here, I wish rather to draw attention to a particularly salient aspect of his practice in the light of Goehr's critique of open works in *The Imaginary Museum*. Boulez can be seen to achieve what Goehr calls the 'neutralisation' of the work-concept. According to Goehr,

> Neutralisation does not imply absence of content; it implies a lack of strong allegiance to too specific an ideological, political, or (where applicable) an aesthetic content. ... If it turned out, now, that the musical work-concept had become neutralised, that might mean that its force had effectively freed itself from its original romantic associations. And if it did mean that, one could now understand how musicians could reject outright the romantic aesthetic without thereby rejecting the contemporary work-concept.[28]

As I have described it, the approach to the work-concept espoused by Boulez destabilises the Romantic ideology of definitive, closed works. All progress is understood to be provisional. The necessity of definitive, closed structure is voided. Thus, the ultra-Romantic ideal of *Werktreue* (or 'fidelity to the work') is undermined because the object of fidelity is open to revision. Whilst the same cannot be said of the canonic repertory that Boulez frequently conducts and records, it is clear that he nonetheless approaches that repertory as essentially open to a multiplicity of interpretations. He shows no interest in the ideal performance dictated by *Werktreue* or the composer's intentions, and when asked if he listens to his own recordings, he replies: 'I don't want to listen to them because I don't want to imitate myself. I don't want to see my photograph of

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[26]Quoted in Boulez and Gerard Mortier, 'Interpretations', *Grand Street*, 55 (Winter 1996), 178.

[27]Whether Boulez has succeeded in any of these ventures is a different question altogether, and one for which space does not permit a close examination here. However, for a critical assessment of IRCAM and its projects, see Georgina Born, *Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).

[28]*The Imaginary Museum*, 266.

a score from twenty years ago; I want to go back to the score and take another picture.'[29]

Like most luminaries of the post-war avant-garde, Boulez's theories were originally predicated on the idea of a total break from the past. In Goldman's words, the young Boulez was 'building up a theory of music from first principles: a decidedly structuralist ambition'.[30] This is not at all to say that he succeeded in doing so. But, by remaking the work-concept such that it is open and subservient to his musical practices, Boulez may be seen to succeed in at least weakening its ideological content.

To take the example of electronic music and technological mediation, Goehr describes electroacoustic music as the ultimate conclusion of the Romantic ideology of formalism that was aligned with the work-concept, in which the sacrifice of subjectivity to the work results in a single, static object.[31] Boulez's own use of electronics is diametrically opposed to such a fixed product. Instead he uses systems capable of real-time processing which modify and respond to live performers, freeing them from the formal constraints of most composed electronic and tape music.[32] Boulez is espousing a practical reconsideration of the work-concept whilst rejecting its ideological content.

Even though strong claims can be made for Boulez's neutralisation of the work-concept in his practices, this is not at all to say that the concept's regulative force and function have been displaced. The work is still the primary vessel for making music in Boulez's activities. More importantly, it is not to claim that the work-concept is redefined within the wider musical culture. Though Boulez might claim to subordinate and make transparent the ideological nature of thinking in terms of works, his ideas and activities are but a single perspective within a tradition where history weighs down heavily upon the present. His sole efforts could not seriously challenge the work-concept even if he wanted them to. As Goehr writes: '[W]e have to challenge [a regulative concept] on contemporary terms in order to dismantle it. Small-scale challenges are inadequate to the whole job. To fully dismantle the force of a concept, one needs a global paradigmatic shift'.[33]

It remains to be seen how the work-concept will operate in the twenty-first century. Scholars in other fields have already noted the impact of digital

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[29]Quoted in Boulez and Mortier, 'Interpretations', 175. In his infamous analysis of Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring*, Boulez explicitly disregards Stravinsky's creative processes and intentions in favour of an 'imminent' examination of the score; see 'Stravinsky Remains' in *Stocktakings*, 55–110.

[30]Goldman, *The Musical Language of Pierre Boulez*, 20.

[31]*The Imaginary Museum*, 266–8.

[32]Boulez, 'Technology and the Composer', in *Orientations*, 486–94.

[33]*The Imaginary Museum*, 271.

media and internet streaming services on the consumption and conceptualisation of popular music, and it seems likely that the way we think about music as an art medium will similarly change in the future.[34] Developments in internet and communications technologies have effected immense transformations in the social and cultural spheres during the last twenty years. Such a 'global paradigmatic shift' may well destabilise the regulative force of the concept that has governed musical practice up to the present. Whether the future of the work-concept will turn out to be Boulezian or something entirely different will become clear only in time.

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[13] Goehr, Lydia. *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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[34]See John Richardson, Claudia Gorbman, and Carol Vernallis, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of New Audiovisual Aesthetics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), and see especially Lawrence Kramer's chapter 'Classical Music for the Posthuman Condition', 39–53.

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A translation of
Marcel Schwob's *Imaginary Lives*

Conal Grealis*
Faculty of Modern Languages

Despite enjoying considerable influence and renown in the late nineteenth century, Marcel Schwob (1867-1905) was all but forgotten over the course of the century that followed. He was particularly well regarded during his lifetime for his remarkable erudition and the wealth of scholarly essays, articles, and literary reviews he produced. But it would be short sighted to reduce Schwob to a mere scholar, interested in only the obscure and arcane. In doing so we would overlook both the sensitivity of his work and his commitment to exploring new forms of artistic expression.

Dissatisfied with the attempts of the ancient writers he had studied, Schwob showed particular interest in developing a new form of biography, one which shunned generalised and classified historical accounts in favour of producing something more artistic. 'Art', he said, 'describes individuals and desires only the unique.' This preoccupation with intricacy, with obscurity, with triviality can be read in the twenty-two *Imaginary Lives* Schwob published in 1896, of which three have been translated here. Each varies considerably in terms of style and narrative voice, but all three are linked by Schwob's flair for expressing in artistic form the lives of individuals of all descriptions, whether real or imagined.

*Email: conal.grealis@new.ox.ac.uk

Lucretius – Poet

Lucretius appeared in a great family which had withdrawn from public life. He lived his first days in the shadow of the black porch of a tall house set in the mountains. The atrium was austere and the slaves silent. From his infancy, he was surrounded by contempt for politics and men. The noble Memmius, who was the same age, put up with whatever games Lucretius imposed on him in the forest. Together they marvelled at the wrinkled bark of the old trees and contemplated the trembling of their leaves in the sun, like a verdant veil of light, strewn with dappled gold. They often studied the striped backs of the wild swine which rooted at the ground. They passed through bursts of quivering bees and moving columns of marching ants. And one day, emerging from a copse, they came across a clearing surrounded on all sides by ancient cork-oaks, sitting so closely together that their circle bore a well of blue into the sky. The tranquillity of this refuge was infinite.

It seemed as though one were on a broad, bright road which made for the heights of divine air. Here, Lucretius was touched by the blessing of calm spaces.

With Memmius, he left the serene temple of the forest to study the art of eloquence at Rome. The old gentleman who ruled over the tall house gave him a Greek tutor and told him to come back only once he had mastered the art of scorning mankind's ways. Lucretius never saw him again; he died alone, despising the tumult of society. When Lucretius returned he brought with him into the tall, empty house, through the austere atrium and among the silent slaves, an African woman – beautiful, barbarous, and wicked. Memmius had returned to the house of his fathers. Lucretius had witnessed enough bloody dissension, partisan warfare, and political corruption. He was in love.

And to begin with his life was enchanted. The African woman would lean the contoured masses of her hair against the hangings on the walls. Her whole body would lie draped over the daybeds. With arms laden with translucent emeralds she would encircle craters full of foaming wine. She had a strange way of raising a finger and shaking her head. Her smiles had a deep, mysterious source, like the rivers of Africa. Instead of spinning wool, she would unpick it patiently into little flocks which flew around her.

Lucretius had an ardent desire to melt into her beautiful body. He would embrace her metallic breasts and press his mouth to her dark purple lips. Words of love passed between them, were sighed, made them laugh, and wore thin. They touched the flowing, opaque veil which stands between lovers. Their desire grew in its fury and sought to merge their bodies. It reached the extreme point of spreading itself throughout their flesh without penetrating as far as the innards.

The African woman withdrew into her foreign heart. Lucretius despaired of his inability to complete their love. The woman became scornful, gloomy, and silent, like the atrium and the slaves. Lucretius wandered about the library.

It was there that he unfurled the scroll on which a scribe had copied Epicurus' treatise. At once he understood the diversity of things in this world and the futility of striving towards ideas. The universe seemed to him comparable to the little flocks of wool which the fingers of the African woman would scatter through the halls. The swarms of bees and the columns of ants and the shifting fabric of the leaves were to him now groups upon groups of atoms.

And throughout his whole body he felt the presence of an invisible and discordant people, eager to disperse. And his gaze seemed to him now to be finely embodied rays of a more subtly material nature, and the image of the beautiful barbarian a pleasant and colourful mosaic, and he felt that the end of this infinite movement was sad and vain. He watched the whirling of masses of atoms, just like Rome's bloody factions with their troupes of armed and insulting clients, stained with the same blood and fighting for some obscure supremacy. And he saw that the dissolution of death was nothing but the emancipation of this turbulent mob which rushes on towards a thousand other futile movements.

So when Lucretius had been thus instructed by the papyrus scroll, its Greek words woven with one another like the world's atoms, he went out into the forest through the black porch of the tall house of his ancestors. And he saw the backs of the striped swine who would always have their noses turned towards the earth. Then, passing through the copse, he suddenly found himself in the middle of the serene temple of the forest, and his eyes dived into the blue well of the sky. That was where he found his repose.

From that place he contemplated the swarming immensity of the universe: all the stones, all the plants, all the trees, all the animals, all the men, with all their colours, their passions, their instruments and the history of these various things, their births, their sicknesses, and their deaths. And in among these inevitable, necessary deaths, he perceived clearly the singular death of the African woman, and he wept.

He knew that weeping arises from a particular movement of the little glands under the eyelids which are disturbed by a stream of atoms given off by the heart when the heart in turn has been struck by a succession of colourful images which detach themselves from the surface of the body of a woman one loves. He knew that love is caused by nothing more than the swelling of atoms which desire to join with other atoms. He knew that the sadness caused by death is the worst of all earthly illusions, since the dead person has ceased to be unhappy and to suffer, while the mourner is afflicted by his own sorrows and dreams darkly of his own

death. He knew that we leave no simulacrum to pour out tears for our own corpse stretched out at our feet. Yet, having now the experience of sadness, and love, and death, which he knew were only vain images when considered from the calm space where he must shut himself away, he continued to weep, and to want love, and to fear death.

That is why, returning to the tall, dark house of his ancestors, he approached the beautiful African woman, who was brewing something on the brazier in a metal pot. For she, too, had been contemplating, and her thoughts had gone back to the mysterious source of her smile. Lucretius studied the beverage as it boiled away. Little by little it grew lighter and became like a stormy green sky. And the beautiful African woman shook her head and raised a finger. Then Lucretius drank the philtre. And at that very instant his reason disappeared, and he forgot all the Greek words of the papyrus scroll. And for the first time, now a madman, he knew love. And in the night, having been poisoned, he knew death.

Katherine the Lacemaker – working girl

She was born around the middle of the fifteenth century, in the rue de la Parcheminerie, near the rue Saint-Jacques, in a winter so cold that the wolves ran through Paris on the snow. An old woman with a red nose under her cap took her in and brought her up. And in the beginning, she played in the doorways with Perrenette, Guillemette, Ysabeau, and Jehanneton, who wore little petticoats and would stick their small, reddened hands into the gutters to catch pieces of ice. They would also watch the boys cheating passers-by at the game known as Saint-Merry. And under the porches, they would gaze at the tripe in buckets, and the long swaying sausages, and the big iron hooks where the butchers hung the cuts of meat. Near Saint-Benoît-le-Bétourné, where the scriveners' rooms are, they would listen to the scratching of their quills and, in the evening, would blow out the candles in the clerks' faces through the little windows of the booths. At the Petit-Pont they would taunt the fishwives and take flight towards the Place Maubert, hiding in the nooks of the rue des Trois-Portes. Then, sitting on the edge of the fountain, they would chatter away until the night fog came.

That was how Katherine spent her early days, before the old woman had taught her to sit before a lacemaking pillow and intertwine the threads from all the bobbins patiently. Later, she made a trade of it, Jehanneton having become a cap-maker, Perrenette a washerwoman, and Ysabeau a glover, and Guillemette, the most fortunate, a sausage maker, with a little crimson face which gleamed as if it had been scrubbed with fresh pig's blood. For the boys who had played at Saint-Merry, other ventures were already underway; some were studying on

the Montagne Sainte-Geneviève, some were shuffling cards at the Trou-Perrette, others were raising cups of Aunis wine at the Pomme de Pin or getting into fights at the Grosse Margot. At around midday, you would see them at the entrance to the inn on the rue aux Fèves, and around midnight, they would leave by the door onto the rue aux Juifs. As for Katherine, she would intertwine the threads of her lace, and on summer evenings would take the cooler evening air on the bench by the church, where they were permitted to laugh and chatter.

Katherine wore a cream smock and a gown of a green colour; she was quite mad for fine clothes, though she hated nothing so much as seeing girls wearing padded skirts, which only drew attention to them when they weren't at all noble. She also had a fondness for money: silver *teston* coins, *blancs* worth ten *sous*, and, above all, golden *écus*. That's how she came to make the acquaintance of Casin Cholet, a seargent at Châtelet, who, under the pretence of this position, gained money by ill means. She often had supper with him at the Mule Inn, opposite the église des Mathurins, and after supper Casin Cholet would go off to steal chickens by the ditches out beyond the city walls. He would bring them back under his large tabard, and sold them for a good profit to Arnoul's widow, Machecroue, a beautiful poulteress by the gate of the Petit-Châtelet.

And soon after, Katherine stopped working as a lacemaker: for the old woman with the red nose was rotting in the mass grave at the Cimetière des Innocents. Casin Cholet found his friend a little ground floor room near the Trois-Pucelles, and would come to see her there late in the evening. He didn't stop her from showing herself at the window with her eyes blackened with charcoal, and her cheeks coated with white lead. All the pots, cups, and dishes on which Katherine would offer something to eat and drink to those who paid well were stolen from the Chaire Inn, or the Cygnes, or the Plat-d'Étain. Casin Cholet disappeared one day, having pawned Katherine's dress and half girdle at the Trois-Lavandières. His friends told the lacemaker that he had been beaten behind a cart and chased out of Paris by the Baudoyer gate, on the orders of the provost. She never saw him again; and being now quite alone, no longer having the heart to earn a living, she became a working girl, setting up wherever she could.

At first she waited at tavern doors; and those who knew her took her behind walls, under the Châtelet, or against the Collège de Navarre; then, when it got too cold, a kindly old woman got her into a bawdy-house where the mistress gave her shelter. She lived there in a little stone room, strewn with green rushes. They let her keep her name 'Katherine the Lacemaker', although she did no lace work at all. On occasion they gave her leave to wander the streets, on the condition that she return before the customers arrived. And Katherine would wander near the glovers' and the cap makers', and many a time stayed a long while envying the

blood-coloured face of the sausage maker, who laughed among her cuts of pork. Then she would return to the house, which the mistress lit up at dusk with candles which burned red and melted thickly behind the darkened windows.

In the end, Katherine grew weary of a life shut up behind four walls; she fled and took to the road. And from then on, she was no longer *Parisienne*, nor a lacemaker, but one of those women who haunt the outskirts of France's towns, waiting on stones in graveyards to give pleasure to any man who passes. These little ones have no name at all but the name that suits their faces. And Katherine had the name Museau, The Snout. She wandered through the fields and would keep a watch on the roadside at night, where her white face could be seen among the mulberry bushes in the hedgerows. Museau learned to endure the fear brought on by spending the night among the dead, though her feet would tremble as she brushed past the tombs. No more silver *testons*, no more *blancs*, no more golden *écus*. She lived poorly on bread and cheese, and a bowlful of water. She had some unfortunate friends who would whisper to her from afar: 'Museau! Museau!' and she loved them.

The saddest thing for her was to hear church and chapel bells; for Museau would remember the June nights when she had sat, in her green gown on the benches by the church porch. Now she envied the young ladies their fine clothes; she had no dress padding, no bonnet now. Leaning on a rough stone, she waited for her crust of bread with her head bare. And in the darkness of the cemetery with her feet sinking into the sticky mud she missed the bawdy house's red candles and the green rushes of the square room.

One night a scoundrel posing as a soldier cut Museau's throat to take her girdle. But he found no purse.

Messrs Burke and Hare – murderers

Mr William Burke was raised up from the lowliest of conditions to eternal renown. He was born in Ireland and started out as a cobbler. He practised this profession for several years at Edinburgh where he made a friend of Mr Hare, on whom he had a great influence. In Burke and Hare's partnership, there can be no doubt at all that any inventive or artful qualities were down to Mr Burke. But their names remain inseparable in art, like those of Beaumont and Fletcher. They lived together, worked together, and were caught together. Mr Hare never spoke out against the popular favour which Mr Burke in particular inspired. Such stalwart selflessness has not received due recompense. It is Mr Burke who has bequeathed his name to the special process which brought the two partners to fame. The monosyllable 'burke' will live a long time yet on the lips of men, while the

character Hare has already fallen into the sort of obscurity which spreads unjustly over lesser known collaborators.

Mr Burke appears to have brought to his work the fairy tale imagination of the Green Isle where he was born. His soul must be steeped in folklore. There is something of a distant whiff of the *Thousand and One Nights* in what he did. Like the caliph, wandering the length of the night gardens of Baghdad, he longed for mysterious adventures, being curious for unknown stories and foreign peoples. Like the huge black slave, armed with a heavy scimitar, he found no better conclusion for this desire than the deaths of others. But his Anglo-Saxon originality lay in his ability to pluck the most practical parts from the meanderings of his Celtic imagination. When he had satisfied his artistic pleasure, what, I ask you, would the black slave do with those whose heads he had cut off? With all an Arab's barbarity, he cut them up into quarters to keep them, salted, in a cellar. What use did he get out of that? None at all. Mr Burke was infinitely superior.

In some way Mr Hare was his Dinarzade. It seems that his friend's presence was particularly stimulating to Mr Burke's powers of invention. Their fantastical dreams allowed them to make use of a hovel as a setting for their grand aspirations. Mr Hare lived in a garret room on the sixth floor of a very crowded Edinburgh townhouse. A sofa, a large chest, and some washing implements, comprised, no doubt, almost all the furnishings. On a little table, there was a bottle of whisky with three glasses. As a rule, Mr Burke would receive only one person at a time, and never the same one more than once. His method was to invite in an unknown passer-by, just as night was falling. He would wander the streets to look out for faces which piqued his curiosity. Sometimes he chose at random, introducing himself to the stranger with all the civility of Harun al-Raschid. The stranger would climb the six floors of Mr Hare's garret. They would give him the sofa and offer him Scotch whisky to drink. Mr Burke would ask him about the most surprising events of his life. There was no listener more insatiable than Mr Burke. The stranger's story was always interrupted before daybreak by Mr Hare. Mr Hare's manner of interrupting was always the same, and very forceful. To interrupt the story, Mr Hare had a tendency to move behind the sofa and apply both hands to the mouth of the storyteller. At the same moment, Mr Burke would come and sit on his chest. In this position, quite motionless, they would dream up together the end of the story which they never heard. In this way, Messrs Burke and Hare finished off a great number of stories which the world will never know.

When the story had come to a definite stop, along with the teller's breath, Messrs Burke and Hare would explore the mystery. They would undress the stranger, admire his jewellery, count out his money, read his letters. Some of the correspondence was quite interesting. Then they would leave the body to

cool in Mr Hare's large chest. This is where Mr Burke would display his great practicality of mind.

It was important that the cadaver was fresh but not still warm, so that none of the pleasure of the adventure would go to waste.

In the early years of the nineteenth century, doctors studied anatomy with great passion, but, owing to religious principles, they had a great deal of difficulty in procuring subjects for dissection. Mr Burke, showing great presence of mind, recognised science's dearth. It is not known how he was connected with so venerable and learned a practitioner, Doctor Knox, who taught at the faculty at Edinburgh University. Perhaps Mr Burke had followed public lectures, though his imagination inclined him more towards the artistic. It is certain, however, that he promised to do his best to help Doctor Knox. For his part, Doctor Knox agreed to pay him for his efforts. The rate decreased according to age, with the highest rates for the bodies of young people and the lowest for those of the elderly, which held only a mild interest for Doctor Knox. This was Mr Burke's opinion too, for they usually had less imagination. Doctor Knox became famous among his colleagues for his anatomical knowledge. Messrs Burke and Hare made the most of their life as dilettantes, and we should no doubt consider this as the golden age of their partnership.

For the remarkable genius of Mr Burke would soon lead him beyond the norms and rules of a tragedy in which he always had a story and a confidant. Mr Burke moved on alone – it would be childish to consider Mr Hare's influence any further – towards a kind of Romanticism. The backdrop of Mr Hare's hovel was no longer enough for him; he devised a strategy to make use of the nightly fogs. Mr Burke's countless imitators have tarnished the originality of his method somewhat. But this is the true tradition of the master.

Mr Burke's fertile imagination had grown weary of stories of human experience which were perpetually alike. The results had never lived up to his expectations. He came to be interested in the real aspects alone, which he found varied with each death. He confined all the drama to the dénouement. The quality of the actors was no longer of interest to him. It fell to chance. The sole prop in the theatrical works of Mr Burke was a cloth mask full of pitch. Mr Burke would go out of a foggy night, holding this mask in his hand and accompanied by Mr Hare. Mr Burke would wait for the first passer-by, walk past him, then, doubling back, would apply the pitch mask to his face suddenly and solidly. At that moment, Messrs Burke and Hare would grab hold of the actor's arms, one from each side. The cloth mask filled with pitch was an ingenious means of both muffling his cries and stopping his breath. What's more, it was tragic. The fog blurred the gestures of the role. Some of the actors seemed to mimic drunkards.

Once the scene was over, Messrs Burke and Hare would take a cab, and disrobe their character; Mr Hare would supervise the costumes, and Mr Burke would take a fresh, clean cadaver to Dr Knox's.

Unlike the majority of biographers, it is at this point that I shall leave Messrs Burke and Hare, in the midst of their crowning glory. Why destroy such beautiful artistic effect by driving them, languid, to the end of their careers, revealing their failures and their disappointments? There's no need at all to see them otherwise than with their mask in hand, wandering the streets on a foggy night. For the end of their lives was vulgar and similar to so many others. It would appear that one of them was hanged and that Dr Knox had to leave the faculty of Medicine at Edinburgh. Mr Burke left no other works.

Aspirations and Incentives:
An Investigation into Changing Agricultural Behaviour in Rural South Africa

Matthew de la Hey*

Saïd Business School

Various authors have observed the under-cultivation or abandonment of agricultural land historically used by rural South Africans to grow crops in pursuit of self-sufficiency and in fulfilment of cultural imperatives. This article is a summary of research conducted by the author on the changing place of agriculture in rural South African livelihoods, via a study in the Mbotyi village in the ex-Transkei. Fieldwork centred on interviewing people living in these areas was conducted in order to obtain their perspectives and perceptions, with particular emphasis placed on communicating with the youth. Behaviour is changing as a result of environmental pressures, the erosion of traditional patriarchy, limited access to inputs, altered aspirations, and alternative occupations and means of making money, manifesting in constraints on the quantity of available labour. Nevertheless there is still widespread interest in agriculture. It is imperative that policy makers and development workers operate having given deep consideration to the specific difficulties, needs and aspirations of those they seek to impact.

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*Email: Matthew.delaHey@mba2014.sbs.oxford.edu

During the twentieth century segregationist legislation in South Africa created ethnically distinct 'reserves' which became the basis for semi-independent homeland states. It is in regions such as these that the bulk of South Africa's rural poverty is concentrated and that the greatest challenges for rural development exist (Bank and Minkley 2005; Kepe 2005). They remain less developed, have generally poor infrastructure, high unemployment rates, and are largely rural. Land tenure is communal. However, it is in these areas that black South Africans have the most ready access to cultivable land. The Rural Survey conducted in the former homeland areas by Statistics South Africa in 1999 found that 71% of the population had "access to land for farming purposes" (1999). More recently, in 2005, the Centre for Development and Enterprise explained that there are "about 3 million hectares of high-quality agricultural land in areas occupied by African people, largely in the ex-homelands" (2005: 10). Despite this apparent access to land, numerous authors have noted that it is increasingly underutilised with many potentially arable fields lying disused (Andrew, Ainslie, and Shackleton 2005; Fenwick and Lyne 1999; Mfono 2008). The National Department of Agriculture concurred, saying that "significant agricultural resources (human and material) lie unused or underutilised in the former homeland areas" (2001).

It is curious that this underutilisation of the land is occurring in South Africa's ex-homelands, particularly as it is happening in a context of high unemployment and rising food prices. It is even more curious when considered in comparison to the healthy state of small-scale agriculture in some other Southern African countries. I set out to gain a better understanding of why rural South Africans are leaving fertile fields fallow in regions where agriculture has historically been a cornerstone of livelihoods.

I conducted fieldwork in Mbotyi, a small village in the Transkei which is an ex-homeland in the South Eastern part of the country, in what is now the Eastern Cape Province. I stayed in the village during March and April of 2014 and conducted 34 interviews with people aged 20 to 94 in an effort to obtain an idea of the way that life in the village has changed over time, the role of agriculture in their lives and for those who have stopped farming, their motivations for ceasing cultivation.

The literature on ex-homeland agriculture and livelihoods has focused on larger structural concerns, seldom considering the perceptions, experiences and opinions of their inhabitants. A focussed investigation on this scale allowed for a multifaceted analysis of the issues that confront cultivation in Mbotyi. I found that a range of interlinked and inter-reliant factors – a complex mix of incentives, changing attitudes regarding the nature of a *good life*, and a shifting

social landscape – are driving changing behaviour and undermining the ability and the desire to cultivate.

People have integrated themselves into the economy in ways that they perceive minimise household risk and maximise the return for labour expended. Nevertheless, people in Mbotyi have not abandoned agriculture wholesale: rather, they have responded to incentives and pressures by adjusting their livelihood activities and changing their behaviour, altering the nature and extent of their agricultural activity. The area of cultivated land has declined in a context of intensifying environmental pressures including trouble with wildlife – most notably the scourge of nocturnal and dangerous bushpigs which destroy crops, decreased supervision of cattle, changing weather patterns, and limited access to water for irrigation. In the past many of these issues were addressed or at least managed by members of the household. Nowadays near universal school attendance and an erosion of patriarchal control has afforded women and children greater freedoms and has decreased access to household labour. This has been compounded by urban migration in search of jobs, coupled with and in part driven by evolving youth aspirations.

Attitudes towards cultivation have been affected by the availability of cash, largely a result of welfare payments. Since 1994 the South African government has rolled out an extensive social welfare programme providing pensions and child-support grants to those with low incomes. In addition to young people's ideas about what a 'good life' entails, these have undermined the necessity and the desire to cultivate, both for personal consumption and for sale. Mamathelo (55), one of the village's most productive cultivators, expressed her opinion on this issue:

> "Since Mandela started to give them money for the pensions and the grants and all of those things, those people that were farming before, they stopped. And I saw them, after they got money; they're always going to Lusikisiki to buy food instead of farming. I believe that is because of the money. If they don't get money, I'm sure that they won't stop farming; they will carry on because they know [how to farm], and they have got experience for farming. Only those that don't get money from the government, they are still farming."

The erosion of traditional patriarchy and control of the youth has met with (and in part is a result of) altered youth aspirations and self-perceptions that preclude a completely agricultural livelihood. Myalezwa Mantwana (60) expressed his frustration with the change:

> "When we were growing up we would listen to our parents. We were

> doing what they were telling us, ordering us to do. Now, the children, we are unable to rule them."

This is arguably in part a result of near universal primary school attendance. Funeka (50s) explained

> "I think the young generations prefer going to school, and they are not controllable by the parents. They are going to school and they are not very interested on the ploughing and the looking after the cattle."

She used the phrase "esikoleni ivula amehlo" which literally means that 'school opens their eyes'. The belief in the benefit of schooling is widespread, and the prioritising of school attendance is thus understandable. There is also a feeling amongst men that their control over women has waned and with it their ability to make them help with labour. Sonwabile (40) explained:

> "Now, our wives are no longer cooperating. . . I go to weed by myself because my wife is not doing that, I'd [have to] be abusing her to do that. . . Our wives are not trained like our mothers. They have been to school a little bit. They did not spend much time in their parent's hands because they have been away. They did not learn."

People are becoming better educated and increasingly proletarianised, preferring wage-paying work and the purchase of food. This is happening at a time when access to cash from welfare payments and other activities like participation in government employment provision schemes, growing cannabis, or gathering seafood in addition to better transport links to nearby urban centres are enabling reduced reliance upon agriculture. A dynamic, generational shift is underway as increased disincentives to cultivate encounter a decreased need to do so. Snow (29), who works as a receptionist, explained that:

> "Even at school. . . there's no one who wants to do agriculture. . . They are doing tourism, accounting, maths and physics. Not the other stuff. At the time I was schooling the kids, the ones doing accounting, maths and physics, they used to tease the ones doing agriculture: "oh, where are you going to get a job if you're doing agriculture? Where are you going to get a job if you are doing history?", stuff like that. That is why the kids, they are not interested in doing that stuff. People are interested in doing something to help them get a job."

The older generations, mainstays of village agriculture, suggest that they are less able to farm because they no longer have the strength to do so – "waphela amandla" or "the strength is finished" was a phrase that often came up in discussions. There is a feeling that the youth ought to be taking over and that they are letting their parents down. Sikhumba Malelwa (60s) said that

> "The young generation is failing. It ended there when we were still strong to work; now this generation is unable to do it [cultivate]."

The decreased capacity of older cultivators in addition to issues of availability of labour and other troubles has resulted in a shift of focus to garden plots – small bits of cultivated land adjacent to people's houses. The proximity of plots to the homestead and their size means that they are easier to cultivate and to oversee and protect. Myalewwa Mantwana (60s) explained

> "The garden is too small [a manageable size]. It is good for both of us, my wife and me – we can do it by ourselves because it is small enough."

These gardens, at best, are only a partial compensation for field agriculture, and are arguably in part maintained due to historical and cultural ties with cultivation. It is telling that many young people expressed an interest in having garden plots, but very few indicated a desire to be involved in more large scale endeavours. The prevalence of gardens is indicative of the way agricultural occupations and incomes have been scaled back in people's livelihood mixes.

Nevertheless, cultivation is still a vital part of village life. The majority of households are engaged in some agricultural activity, and a handful still rely on it as a primary occupation. Many in the village professed to being extremely interested in cultivating, and some amongst them intended to cultivate when and if they were in a position to do so. Others are already in the process of establishing new gardens in the vicinity of their homesteads. There was also a strong interest in agriculture amongst young people returning from the cities having failed to find employment, indicating that cultivation is serving as a 'fall-back' occupation – a safety net for the unemployed.

The barriers to entry (primarily access to and affordability of necessary inputs) and the previously mentioned issues that make involvement in cultivation difficult are for the most part surmountable. However, government agricultural development initiatives to date have arguably been too broad-sweeping, and their 'top-down' focus has been ineffective: as Kleinbooi (2013) suggests, "a lack of knowledge of how rural people cope with poverty and food insecurity has resulted in the failure of many support measures intended to alleviate poverty." Rather, bespoke and targeted support is what is needed in order to assist those interested in cultivation to do so and to create an enabling environment for those with access to arable land. As Beinart (1992) argues: "[it is] vital that planners and policy makers start with the people they are planning for." The reinvigoration of rural agriculture would improve rural livelihoods and enhance food security promoting developmental objectives. Directed interventions of this sort stand the greatest chance of success.

The objective of this study was to obtain a deeper understanding of the ways in which agriculture is changing in a Transkeian village and to explore the factors influencing people's behaviour. I set out to confirm or modify the views in the existing literature about under-cultivation, the abandonment of arable fields, and the shift to smaller garden plots with the intention of shedding light on people's perceptions of these issues. This research addressed a gap in the literature on the ex-homelands by exploring the reasons for the underutilisation of land in Mbotyi. The evidence is that behaviour has changed as a result of a complex mix of factors, many of which are interrelated and feed into one another in combinations which collectively undermine the ability, desire and necessity to be engaged in arable agriculture. The area of land cultivated has declined in a context of intensifying environmental pressures, decreased access to household labour, alternative income sources and evolving aspirations. One of the major drivers of change is the altered attitudes and aspirations of the youth and the relative freedom that they now enjoy. The people of Mbotyi are by no means "a conglomeration of undifferentiated black masses, vegetating on the periphery of the centres of capitalist development in South Africa" (Levin and Neocosmos, 1989: 231). They have integrated themselves into the economy in ways that minimise household risk and maximise return for labour expended, whilst placing a premium on leisure time. People in Mbotyi have not abandoned agriculture wholesale, rather they have responded to incentives and pressures by adjusting their livelihood activities and changing their behaviour. Development initiatives ought to pay attention to the specific contexts of particular areas and people in order to achieve an effective and sustainable impact.

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What impact did John Paul II have on the Revolutions of 1989?
A Critical analysis of the Polish Pope

Mike J. Lindsay*

School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies

This essay is an investigation into the influence of Pope John Paul II on the revolutions that took place throughout east-central Europe in 1989. The analysis begins by scrutinizing how *post hoc* representations of the Pope have defined his contributions to the revolutions of 1989. This is followed by an analysis of primary source materials related to Poland's Solidarity Trade Union movement. The central argument presented here is that claims of the Pope's decisive influence on the 1989 revolutions are somewhat exaggerated. Whilst the Pope was an iconic figure for the trade union, his influence on Solidarity policy, and on the fortunes of Solidarity during the repressive period from 1981 to 1988, is less pronounced than biographers and historians have argued. This essay concludes by suggesting a thorough and integrated history of 1989 is required, one that avoids simplistic and triumphal judgments.

*Email: michael.lindsay2@new.ox.ac.uk

Introduction

The death of Pope John Paul II on April 2nd 2005 brought an end to one of the most historically significant pontificates in the modern era. In the opinion of many of the obituaries that followed his death, John Paul II's greatest achievement had been to help bring the Cold War to an end. The *Washington Post* described him as the Pope "who helped to conquer Communism"; in the *Sunday Times*, John Cornwell wrote that John Paul II had inspired the movement that ultimately "led to the collapse of the entire Soviet system."[1] Eminent scholars such as John Lewis Gaddis, doyen of Cold War historians, and George Weigel, the Pope's official biographer, have concluded that John Paul II made the crucial difference in the defeat of the Soviet Union. As Weigel has put it, "no account of the largely non-violent collapse of communism in 1989...will be complete or satisfactory unless it takes full account of the revolution of conscience that the Pope ignited in June 1979. The Nine Days of John Paul II were the trigger for all the rest."[2]

The purpose of this article is to subject this argument to critical scrutiny. The retrospective representations of John Paul II, found in relevant biographies and histories of Europe and the Cold War will be analysed in order to ascertain how historians have interpreted the Pope's contribution to 1989 and constructed the reputation of John Paul II as the conqueror of Communism. This will be used as a primer to the second section: an exploration of primary source materials from within or relating to Poland's Solidarity, the trade union formed in August 1980 which became the focal point of democratic opposition to the Communist regime in Poland. The central argument is that biographers of the Pope and historians of the Cold War have had an overwhelming tendency to assume, rather than demonstrate, the influence of the Pope in the events of 1989. In doing so, within the context of important histories and biographies that command an academic and popular audience, these authors have offered accounts that obscure, rather than reveal, important aspects of the history of 1989 as a phenomenon, an important and counterproductive development given that the historiography on this subject is still in its infancy.

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[1] 'John Paul II Dies at 84', *The Washington Post*, Accessed http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21229-2005Apr2.html 20/6/12 12:21; John Cornwell. "Death of a Titan." *Sunday Times*, 3 Apr. 2005: [11]+. *The Sunday Times Digital Archive*. Web. 27 June 2012.

[2] George Weigel, *The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II - The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy* (New York, NY; 2010), p. 186.

Retrospective Visions of John Paul II

In his recent history of the Cold War, Gaddis argues that John Paul II "began the process by which communism in Poland – and ultimately elsewhere in Europe – would come to an end", by articulating a moral vision that undermined the political compromise of Détente and offered a vision for a post-Communist future, inspiring both the people of Communist Europe, and other crucial "leaders" in the fight against Communism.[3]

Weigel quotes this assessment approvingly, but he goes on to embellish Gaddis's proposition. Since his earliest work on the subject, Weigel has argued that the "political Revolution of 1989" would have been impossible without the "moral and cultural revolution" which started with John Paul II's visit to the shrine of the Black Madonna in Częstochowa in June 1979.[4] According to Weigel, this represented the "Final Revolution", "a revolution of the human spirit, frequently informed by a reinvigorated Christian (often Catholic) faith", which involved "living in truth" against the official mendacity of the Communist regimes.[5] For Weigel, this movement had many fathers, but the most important cause was Solidarity in Poland, and the impetus behind Solidarity was John Paul II.[6]

From this starting point, the Pope began the erosion of the "Yalta imperial system, not only in Poland, but throughout Stalin's empire," by preaching "the final revolution".[7] A year after the pilgrimage, "Solidarity banners and poems gave voice to this revolution of the spirit," as the workers at the Gdánsk shipyard took as inspirational symbols "the ikon of the Black Madonna and the portrait of John Paul II".[8] Following the imposition of martial law in December 1981, Weigel suggests that the Church became the main conduit for oppositionist sentiments. With Solidarity criminalized, churches ran educational programmes and dedicated events to displaying traditional Polish culture. They also supported the families of Solidarity activists who had been imprisoned or forced underground.[9]

Following this train of thought, Weigel casts scepticism on the narratives that have come to dominate academic and political discourse on the 1989 Revolutions. Just as the central philosophy of the Soviet Union was overly materialistic, so to

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[3]John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War* (London, 2005), pp. 193, 222-223.

[4]Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (Oxford, 1992), p.16.

[5]Ibid, pp. 41-50.

[6]Ibid, p. 10-13.

[7]Weigel, Final Revolution, p. 131.

[8]Ibid, pp. 134-137.

[9]Jonathan Kwitny, *Man of the Century: The Life and Times of John Paul II* (London, 1997), p. 417.

were most of the explanations for 1989, such as the emphasis placed on the roles of Ronald Reagan or Mikhail Gorbachev, the economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union, the repercussions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords or the 'End of History'' suggested by Francis Fukuyama. Weigel does not discount politics entirely, but in his view John Paul II's most important contribution to the events of 1989 was his revolution of "the human spirit: an expression of the final revolution, and of the transcendent nature of human aspiration."[10] Indeed, Weigel summarises 1989 as follows:

> A nonviolent revolution had swept away Stalin's external empire in less than six months and had established democratic regimes rather than a new reign of terror. Conscience had proven stronger than coercion, once conscience had been rallied in sufficient numbers. Those who participated in the Revolution of 1989 knew that the key figure in creating that revolution had been Pope John Paul II.[11]

This paragraph certainly offers a tidy summary, but this is an historical portrait painted with an exceptionally broad brush. Whilst there is a striking (or, at least, temporally neat) symmetry between John Paul II's pilgrimage in June 1979 and the effective defeat of the Polish Communists in June 1989, it is less clear how the Pope's influence was translated into the events of 1989. Indeed when it comes to accounts of 1989 itself the Pope is often most noteworthy for his absence.

In Michael Walsh's biography for instance, in his chapter on 1988-9 there is no reference to Solidarity's election victory in June 1989 at all, nor to the collapse of Communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Sparse treatments can also be found in the narratives of Edward Stourton, Garry O'Conner, John O'Sullivan and Tad Szulc.[12] Similar failings can be identified in the works of Gaddis and Weigel as well. Gaddis alludes to the "calculated challenges to the status quo" made by the "leaders" like John Paul II, but the man who comes to the fore in the closing stages of Gaddis's narrative is Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union.[13] Many accounts of the Cold War, the history of twentieth century Europe and 1989 itself follow a similar pattern. To give one particularly eye-catching example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a fellow Pole who communicated with John Paul as Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, writes that the Pope "undeniably made strides in fashioning a de facto alliance

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[10]Ibid, pp. 18-35.

[11]Weigel, *Witness*, pp. 432-434.

[12]Michael Walsh, John Paul II: *A Biography* (London, 1994), pp. 188-217; Garry O'Conner, Universal Father: *A Life of Pope John Paul II* (London, 2006) p. 297; John O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope and the Prime Minister* (Washington, DC; 2006), pp. 298-299, 304-308; Tad Szulc, *Pope John Paul II: The Biography* (New York, NY; 1995), pp. 408-410.

[13]Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 230, 237-257.

between the moral impulse for a radical reconstruction of unjust societies with the promotion of pluralistic and democratic change", but this comment is found in a discussion on *Latin America*, not Poland or east-central Europe.[14]

This lack of coverage is even to be found in those works on European history that explicitly attribute responsibility for 1989 to John Paul. Norman Stone, for instance, writes that after 1979 "in effect it was the Pope. . . that now ran affairs", but he provides no evidence for this rather blasé claim.[15] Weigel's account of the fall of Communism in Poland is more detailed and analytically rigourous than many of his fellow biographers, but even his accounts of 1989 are thin. In *The Final Revolution*, after some fifty pages describing the prelude to the revolution in Poland, barely more than a page is used to describe the events of 1988 and 1989.[16] In *The End and the Beginning*, twenty pages are used to cover the "endgame" from 1985 to 1989, compared to forty-eight pages for the period of John Paul II's first pilgrimages to Poland in 1979 and 1981.[17]

History from Below: John Paul II through the eyes of Solidarity

Given that the authors considered above make such great claims for John Paul II's influence on the course of events that led to the revolutions in east-central Europe, it is surprising that their accounts of his activity and influence during that year should be so patchy and superficial. Having considered these secondary sources, the focus of this next section is on primary documents relating to most important case study of John Paul II's influence on the course of events in 1989: Solidarity in Poland.

A variety of sources attest to the arguments made by Weigel and others who place the Pope at the centre of Solidarity's campaign. A cable from the US embassy in Warsaw from June 27th 1989 described how "the Pope takes a very active and personal interest in developments in his mother-land, and his influence here is beyond description."[18] Similarly, an exploration of Solidarity literature by the Polish security services found that Solidarity was heavily influenced by the "modern socio-political thought of the Catholic Church" and would quote directly

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[14]Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1990), p. 220.

[15]Norman Stone, *The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A History of the Cold War* (London, 2010) pp. 533, 554.

[16]Weigel, *Final Revolution*, pp. 103-152, 152-155.

[17]Weigel, *End and Beginning*. For the 'endgame' pp. 167-187. For the first visit to Poland to martial law, pp. 95-143.

[18]U.S. Embassy Warsaw, "Warsaw Embassy Cable, Poland Looks to President Bush," *Making the History of 1989*, Item #379, http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/379 (accessed 8/22/2012, 17:26)

from the homilies of John Paul II.[19] However a general observation to make is that outside of the periods immediately before, during and after the papal pilgrimages, references to John Paul are quite infrequent.[20] This is not a comprehensive survey of Solidarity's published material, but it is nevertheless surprising that the Pope should emerge relatively infrequently within these documents, given, for example, David Willey's contention that the Pope was "a constant reference point" for Solidarity.[21]

These broad comments on the frequency of the Pope's appearances in Solidarity literature aside, the question of content becomes key. A useful starting point for this evaluation is the papal visit of 1987, the last pilgrimage of John Paul II before the '*annus mirabilis*' of 1989. Lech Wałęsa claimed that the Pope's visit was "the most important event" of the entire year, as it marked the beginning of the end for "General Jaruzelski's program of entente and struggle".[22] Other sources from within Solidarity attest to a similar level of enthusiasm; a Solidarity bulletin from Częstochowa described how factory workers were eagerly anticipating the words of "the greatest Pole, John Paul II."[23]

However, perceptions of the papal visit in 1987 were not unanimous. Jonathan Kwitny writes that:

> people's memories – so vivid about John Paul's earlier trips home – are blank on this one. Most people didn't know where the country was headed. With the old enemy disintegrating, and no new heroes, there was no common spirit to galvanize everyone as before.[24]

An explicitly negative testimony can be found in a newsletter from a branch of *Solidarność Walcząca*, Fighting Solidarity, based in Toruń, where the observer was left with "mixed impressions of the day", as despite "the extremely sharp and clear statement of the Pope", a sense of apathy prevailed amongst the crowd.[25]

Whilst it would be wrong to suggest that Fighting Solidarity represented the mainstream of opinion amongst Polish dissidents, their scepticism towards the Pope's influence is surely noteworthy. Similarly, it is interesting that,

[19]Łukasz Kamiński, Wojciech Sawicki, Grzegorz Waligora (eds), *Solidarność Walcząca w Dokumentach, Tom 1 Woczach SB* (Warsaw, 2007), p. 374.

[20]Stan Persky and Henry Flan (eds), *The Solidarity Sourcebook* (Vancouver, 1982), p. 119; Jan Olazek (ed), *Dokumenty Władz NSZZ 'Solidarność', 1981-1989* (Warsaw, 2010), pp. 100-101, 116-117, 124, 126, 152, 164-165, 262-263, 265.

[21]David Willey, *God's Politician: John Paul at the Vatican* (London, 1992), p. 7.

[22]Wałęsa, *Struggle*, p. 112, 120.

[23]*Solidarność Nadodrza*, Issue 35 (Police, 1987).

[24]Kwitny, *Century*, p. 568.

[25]*Solidarnosc Walczaęca: pismo organizacji Solidarnosc Walczaęca Oddział Toruń*, Issue 7, June 1987.

as Kwitny observes, memories of 1987 are less tactile than those of other pilgrimages. Weigel does not describe a similar sense of public forgetfulness, but like Kwitny he argues that 1987 was a very different visit to previous ones, "intended to prepare the ground for the revolution's victory and identify the basic issues the free Poland of the future would face."[26] This is in contrast to the pilgrimages in 1979, which "had ignited the Polish revolution", and 1983, which "had helped keep it alive."[27] This assessment is loaded with a considerable degree of hindsight, assuming as it does that the papal pilgrimages and the overthrow of Polish Communism were inextricably linked. A closer examination of sources relating to the 1983 pilgrimage, for instance, reveals that the tensions within Solidarity that existed in 1987, between passionate optimism and guarded scepticism, were also present during the previous papal visit.

A number of Solidarity publications anticipated John Paul's arrival eagerly. Several articles in the weekly newspaper *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, published before the Pope's visit, described how "millions of Poles…look forward to the Holy Father of his homeland. For us it is a visit of peace and hope" and that "we join you [John Paul] in your prayers for the souls of the victims of martial law."[28] In response to the pilgrimage, a statement by Solidarity's underground leaders such as Zbigniew Bujak celebrated the "great religious movement" and the "moral and social" inspiration conveyed by the Pope.[29] However, as in 1987, doubts crept into other perceptions of the Pope's visit. Bujak himself would observe that, whilst "in the longer term it turned out that that the Pope's visit had actually helped," in the months surrounding the pilgrimage "our region hit its lowest point in terms of organization. During the summer of 1983 we just limped along."[30] Bogdan Lis was especially damning, saying of the Pope's meeting with Jaruzelski: "If it had yielded some benefits to society, then of course it would have been worth it. But more than six months have gone by since the Pope's visit and nothing has changed!"[31]

These perspectives could be accused of being historically short-sighted; all of the assessments quoted from the interviews compiled by Łopiński, Moskit and Wilk were given in 1983 and 1984, and both interviewers and interviewees would later reflect that their opinions derived from "a particular historical moment."[32]

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[26] Weigel, *Witness*, p. 543.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Olazek (ed), *Dokumenty 'Solidarność*, pp. 116-117.

[29] Ibid, p. 124.

[30] From interviews compiled in Maciej Łopiński, Marian Moskit, Maruisz Wilk (eds), *Konspira: Solidarity Underground* (Berkeley, CA; 1990), p. 210.

[31] Ibid, pp. 209-210.

[32] Ibid, p. 236.

With this in mind, one could argue that an argument like Weigel's, written with the ability to approach these questions from a greater epistemic distance, is more useful inasmuch as it allows the author to define a clearer sense of causation. However, the path to the Polish revolution of 1989 was not as simple as Weigel suggests. Contemporary observers like Hansjakob Stehle opined that "the Pope's attempt to heal the emotional and social trauma [of martial law] with a second visit to Poland in 1983 had no real effect."[33] Meanwhile, Timothy Garton Ash wrote of 1983 that

> To see the pope's visit as one great boost for Solidarity, as some Western media have suggested, is at best an oversimplification. The number of active, banner bearing Solidarity demonstrators was, in fact, relatively small... many of them made a rather sober assessment of their position. "That was our last day of freedom," said one standard bearer, and another: "Many of us feel it was a kind of glorious funeral for Solidarity – as an organization."[34]

Once again, this claim, made in 1983, could be accused of being shortsighted. However, there is a crucial truth within this account, namely that during the martial law period Solidarity underwent a number of drastic changes, and was weakened considerably.

Within papal biographies, there is almost no indication of the complex and often bitter evolution of Solidarity during the 1980s, save for an observation that Solidarity was "cross-hatched with tensions."[35] On the crucial underground years of Solidarity's existence, Weigel takes only seven pages, many of which are focused on the role of the "Resistance Church", and his final judgment is that "Solidarity was a great success: a great moral success, and a great political success."[36] Solidarity's eventual victory in 1989 does confirm this view to some extent, but in failing to treat the internal politics of Solidarity in any detail, Weigel rather confirms Padraic Kenney's view that much of the historiography on the Polish democratic opposition falls foul of the "assumption that Solidarity in 1981 leads us to Solidarity in 1989. Anyone who spent time in Poland in the mid-1980s... knows that this is simply not so."[37] As David Ost shows, "by late 1987 Solidarity was on the defensive and in disarray," suffering from the

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[33]Hansjakob Stehle, 'Poland: Can the Church Point the Way?', *The World Today*, 41/2 (1985), p. 41.

[34]Garton Ash, *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe* (New York, 1990) pp. 58-59.

[35]Weigel, *Final Revolution*, pp. 141-142. The reference to the tensions within Solidarity comes only in an account of the pre-martial law period of Solidarity's existence.

[36]Ibid, p. 141-142.

[37]Kenney, 'Review'.

impact of martial law, significant internal discord and substantial criticism from
right-wing Poles.[38]   Having once commanded ten million members, Solidarity
had declined to the point that "[Solidarity] cells 'were so deeply underground that
many workers didn't even know they existed.'"[39]

In eliding this dimension of Solidarity's history, papal biographers and
historians who place John Paul II at the heart of their narratives surrounding
the 1989 revolutions ultimately fail to acknowledge the full complexity of the
struggle between democratic dissidents and the Communist state in Poland. This
criticism is relevant not just for identifying the causes of the 1989 revolution in
Poland, but also in assessing the consequences of 1989. Whilst Solidarity was
ultimately triumphant in the elections of June that year, winning almost every
race they were allowed to contest and forcing the Polish state to expedite the
transition to democracy, within a few years Solidarity had collapsed as a force in
Polish politics. Until relatively recently the memory of Solidarity as the vehicle
for the collapse of Communism in Poland has not formed part of the popular
consciousness. The European Solidarity Centre, a major museum dedicated to
Solidarity, opened in Gdansk in 2014, but earlier commemorations of landmark
dates, such as the 25th Anniversary of Solidarity's founding in 2005, attracted
next to no public attention; as a rule, "it wasn't easy to find public displays of
pride in Poland's democratic revolution."[40] Many were alienated by the economic
consequences of transition from socialism to capitalism, whilst others were
alarmed by the sense that an 'Unfinished Revolution' had taken place, epitomized
in Poland by the defeat of the former leader of Solidarity, Lech Wałęsa, in the
1995 presidential elections, a defeat inflicted by a former Communist minister,
Aleksander Kwasniewski.[41]

Conclusions: The Perils of Historical Triumphalism

In summary, this article has demonstrated that assessments of John Paul II's
contribution to the democratic revolutions in 1989 have been seriously flawed.
This is not to say that the Pope was not an important figure, especially in the
case of Poland. In addition to those primary sources quoted above which show
the esteem in which the Pope was held by Solidarity, a number of academic

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[38]David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since
1968* (Philadelphia, PA; 1990), pp. 149-186.

[39]Ibid, p. 208.

[40]Anne Applebaum, 'Solidarity Remembered' http://www.anneapplebaum.com/2005/08/31/
solidarity-remembered/

[41]James Mark, *The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern
Europe* (New Haven and London, 2010), pp. 1-26.

works, such as those by Jan Kubik and Mary-Jane Osa, have shown how important religious tradition and institutions in general and John Paul II in particular were influential in helping to shape the democratic opposition in Poland.[42][43] However, the central contention of authors such as John Gaddis and George Weigel, that the Pope was the driving force behind the collapse of Communism, not just in Poland but in east-central Europe, has not been demonstrated.

Whilst these works have many merits, their argument on this point is essentially superficial, and indicative of a tendency of other works on 1989 more generally: a romantic 'End of History' mentality which has become a highly influential and often problematic paradigm for Western policy makers.[44] Take for example Victor Sebestyen, who prefaces his work on 1989 by saying: "This is a story with a happy ending," or Timothy Garton Ash, who has described 1989 as "possibly...the best moment in European history."[45] Similarly, Weigel, whilst cautioning against valedictory judgments, he himself writes that "the rise of Solidarity was such a splendid instance of the good guys battling against long odds and finally beating the bad guys that the temptation to romanticize the whole business can be almost irresistible."[46] As one reviewer observed, Weigel's resistance often appears to have been overcome, as "Weigel writes, one senses, with one hand on the keyboard and the other on the heart."[47]

The peaceful collapse of Communism in East-Central Europe was and is a cause for celebration, but in adopting such a laudatory register there is a danger that the complexities of the revolutions, and their controversial consequences, will be given short shrift for the sake of telling of an uplifting story. This is exemplified in the representations of John Paul II analysed here, wherein the Pope has been cast the hero who conquered the "Evil Empire" of the Soviet Union.

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[42]Mary Jane Osa, *Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition* (Minneapolis, MN; 2003)

[43]Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (University Park, PA; 1994).

[44]Barbara J. Falk, 'From Berlin to Baghdad: learning the 'wrong' lessons from the collapse of communism' in eds George Lawson, Chris Armbruster and Michael Cox, *The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 243-270.

[45]Sebestyen, 1989, p. 1; IWM Vienna, '20 Years after 1989', Accessed http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rXUCFrmPTLs 19/7/12 13:37.

[46]Weigel, *Final Revolution*, p. 141.

[47]Roger Homan, 'Review: *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism*', *International Affairs*, 70/1 (1994), p. 139

Coins and Ancient History

Christopher de L'isle*

Department of Ancient History

The challenge in studying the ancient past is that the source material is sparse and problematic. Ancient literary texts offer narratives of events, but focus on the intrigues and wars of the elites, twisted by their own goals and assumptions, and were often written centuries after the events they describe. Archaeological discoveries provide solid remains of ancient lives - elite and non-elite - but mostly describe long term trends, are blind to phenomena that don't leave material traces, and speak only through their excavators. Inscriptions and ancient papyrus documents generally focus on the specific matter at hand, expecting the reader to supply the very contextual information that modern scholars often seek to discover from them; literally and figuratively they tend to break off just as they are getting interesting.

Reconstructing the ancient past, therefore, requires the mixture of different types of sources into the soup of history in the hope that the advantages of one will cover the deficiencies of another. The evidence provided by ancient coins, long used sparingly by mainstream history and analysed in-depth by their own separate specialists, increasingly spices the soup. Yet numismatic scholarship tends to be technical and very tightly focussed on specific issues; it can be difficult for outsiders to find general overviews of coinage evidence, its strengths and its weaknesses.[1] For many, it remains an acquired taste. But, while no student of the ancient past can be a connoisseur of every type of source, they must know how to interpret source-based arguments; so that when presented with one, they know how much salt to apply. This is what I aim to provide here.

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*Email: cmdelisle@gmail.com
[1]But for a book-length introduction, see Howgego (1995) or Metcalf (2012).

Coins as Money

Coins are a type of money, a physical storage of wealth, acquired and valued primarily for its ability to be exchanged for other objects, rather than for its own sake. Money is distinct from staples, like foodstuffs and livestock, which many ancient (and modern) societies used as their principal means of exchange, but whose primary purpose remained their ability to sustain life. Staples cannot easily be stored and eventually, if not consumed, they will rot, decay, or die; money will remain intact and unchanged for lifetimes.[2] As a form of money, ancient coins are special because they were made from substances already valued by society (gold, silver, bronze) and the amount of those substances they contained was standardised by the issuer. Other forms of money are possible which do not combine these two factors: Ancient Mesopotamia and Iron Age Europe used hacked up pieces of silver, a socially valued substance, but they did not standardise the lumps of silver; at each transaction the silver had to be weighed and examined for purity in order to determine its value. At the other extreme, modern societies use paper and digital money, made from materials society does not attach high value to, but given a standardised value by its issuer. This system, where money is physically worthless, makes users uncomfortable without very deep trust in the regulatory system which produces and guarantees the money. Such deep trust did not exist until abandonment of the gold standard in the mid-twentieth century, but ancient coinage represents the first step towards it in its combination of these two different kinds of value: that given to their material substance by society operating as a market and that given to them as standardised units of value by society operating as a government.

The aetiological story numismatists offer for this combination is set in seventh century BC Lydia.[3] There, the rivers produced lots of gold, mixed with silver in a compound known as electrum, which looks similar regardless of the proportion of gold and silver in it. Thus the purity of electrum, and hence its value, was difficult for the market to determine, producing an unusual demand for regulation, which the Lydian kings filled.[4] This Lydian innovation spread throughout the Mediterranean world because it offered advantages to both users and producers of money. Users didn't have to determine money's value before every transaction; an individual coin could be trusted to have the value the issuer said it did. Advantage for the issuer lay in the ability to control a significant form of wealth production and in the possibility of profiting by producing coins

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[2]On the distinction between staples and wealth, see Polanyi (1968): 175-203.

[3]On Lydian coinage see Kroll (2010).

[4]Wallace (1987).

worth less than their face value.[5] Almost immediately the Lydian kings began decreasing the amount of gold in their electrum coinage. Eventually the gold content was so low that the Lydians lost confidence in their kings' coinage and a new pure gold coinage had to be introduced. The first currency was also the first currency failure. All subsequent coin systems walk this same dangerous tightrope between their material and legal values.

Three types of metal were used for coinage in the ancient world: gold, silver, and bronze. As today, gold had the highest value. Even very small coins were valuable and only the largest regimes, like Persia, the Macedonian kingdoms, and Rome, had the resources and the expenditure to make gold coins regularly. Silver coinages were much more common, produced by thousands of ancient cities. Like the Lydian gold, silver's purity is often difficult to determine, since it occurs naturally with varying amounts of lead. This uncertainty may have encouraged the spread of silver coinage through the Mediterranean. Though less valuable than gold, silver was too valuable to easily carry out small transactions. Small change might be only a few millimetres across – easy to lose and impractical to use.[6] Presumably, this is where the staple economy usually took over from the money economy. But from the mid-fourth century BC, a third metal came into use for smaller coins: bronze. Perhaps this reflects greater numbers of temporary residents in communities (e.g. pilgrims, merchants, garrisons), who did not possess the raw materials with which to engage in the staple economy.[7] Bronze had some social value, but only in impractically large quantities, so it was mostly issued with a face value much higher than the value of its material. It was thus a token coinage similar to our banknotes, but unlike them, it was backed up by the promise that it could be converted into a certain amount of silver.

Manufacture and dating

To make a coin, you first need a disc of blank metal, called a flan. A number of methods for the creation of these discs are possible: slicing up a metal rod, cutting a metal sheet, recycling old coins, or casting in moulds.[8] Great precision

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[5]Why coinage spread is debated: one perspective stresses its administrative advantages to issuers: Cook (1958); Kraay (1964); Martin (1996). An alternative stresses the advantages for consumers: Sheedy (2006): 4-5. Non-economic factors have also been argued, like the possibility that issuing coins demonstrated sovereignty: Finley (1973): 166, or civic pride: Howgego (1990): 20. None of these are mutually exclusive.

[6]Kim (1994).

[7]Puglisi (2010).

[8]The rod method is known from finds in the Athenian *agora* and is suggested by the name of Athens' smallest denomination: ὀβολός (obolos), Greek for "rod": Thompson (1976): 153, 257-8.

was achieved in production, with gold coins varying in weight by mere hundredths of a gram. To create the designs which allow coins to be distinguished, the flan was placed between two iron stamps, called dies, one in an anvil and one in a hammer. The flan was whacked with the hammer, impressing designs carved on the dies into the two faces of the flan.[9] The focus on creating a large number of objects of identical weight and appearance makes coin production one of the earliest examples of mass production. But, as the dies were used, they slowly cracked and eventually broke. At this point new dies would be produced, and consequently the design of the coins would change, even if only slightly.[10]

Understanding this process offers the possibility of dating coins, which is useful for dating archaeological contexts and essential for almost any use of coins as historical data. The replacement of cracked and broken dies is the key to this vital information. Since it is unlikely that both dies would break at the same time (the hammer breaks more frequently than the anvil), similar coin designs can be arranged through close examination into a sequence, called a series, linked by the coins which differ on one side (where a die has broken and been replaced) but share the same design on the other side (the die which remains in use). In practice this is more difficult than it first appears. Most mints used more than one set of dies at once, perhaps swapping them around day by day, and they didn't always use them right up until they broke, sometimes reusing them after a period of inactivity. As a result, neat sequences are the exception rather than the rule. Most are much messier affairs and the number of different dies and links within a series is often too high for any useful sequence to be produced. Additionally, as we possess only the smallest portion of the coins produced in antiquity, random chance may rob us of the coins that form a link, creating an apparent break that did not actually occur. Nevertheless it is usually possible to identify which coins belong together as a single series, even if the exact internal structure of that series is beyond us.[11]

Individual series could continue for very long periods of time (sometimes centuries), but they would eventually by replaced by redesigns marking the beginning of a new series. The most straightforward example of this is the change of name and portrait which (usually) occurred at the accession of a new Roman Emperor. Many changes are less dramatic than this and their causes more

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On recycled coins, see discussion of overstrikes below. Moulds have been found in Israel, but only for bronze coins: Ariel (2012).

[9]Archaeologists have uncovered few dies; probably they were usually destroyed after use. They are catalogued in Vermeule (1954); Malkmus (1989-93).

[10]Further details of the manufacturing process: Mørkholm (1991): 12-19. Sellwood (1963) and Beer-Tobey & Tobey (1993) publish experiments in coin manufacture.

[11]Esty (1990) discusses the method's assumptions and limitations.

enigmatic. Thus, the next step after identifying the individual series and making an attempt to understand their internal organisation is to widen the scope and arrange the individual series into chronological order. In some cases this is very easy, thanks to a phenomenon called overstriking – where an old coin has been recycled and re-struck with the new design, but the old design shows through. This irrefutably establishes that the new design postdates the older one.

When there are no overstrikes, chronological order has to be restored using historical events, stylistic comparisons, stratigraphy in archaeological excavations, presence or absence from hoards, and changes in weight and shape. If changes in coin designs can be tied to historical events, it is sometimes possible to assign absolute dates. In practice again, things are more complicated than one first hopes. To start with, a neat sequence of series is not the only option. Issues may occur simultaneously,[12] there may be gaps in which no coinage was issued,[13] and earlier designs may be resumed after a pause.[14] Secondly, most methods for arranging series into chronological order face problems. The use of (known) historical events to determine the order of series is usually straightforward for the accession of a new emperor or king, but in other cases the method is stymied by the vast number of events we do not know about, particularly concerning the local politics which drove many mints. Further, events that proved important to ancient and modern historians in retrospect may not have had an immediate effect on coin production.[15] The internal turmoil in Athens at the end of the fifth century is stressed by Thucydides and Xenophon, but caused no change in the design of Athenian currency. Dates based on stylistic comparisons are also problematic. They have often been based on very minor features and unselfconsciously subjective assessments of quality.[16] Further, they can be thrown off by intentional archaism or made impossible by poorly preserved coins. Dating using the stratigraphy of archaeological excavations has issues too. Stratigraphy reveals only when a coin was deposited, not when it was produced.

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[12]E.g. Alexander the Great continued minting his father Philip II's coinage alongside his own: Le Rider (1977).

[13]Puglisi (2010).

[14]E.g. Augustus' coins were reissued during the civil war after Nero's death, perhaps by provinces trying to stay neutral: Sutherland & Carson (1984): 199-200; Agathokles of Bactria (c.185-170 BC) reissued coins of a number of predecessors, perhaps to emphasise his legitimate descent: Hoover (2013): 25-31.

[15]Some modern comparanda: The 2010 Egyptian revolution had no effect on the designs of Egyptian coinage; the 1959 Cuban revolution did, but not until 1961; Britain redesigned most of its coinage in 2008 for no political reason.

[16]E.g. Poole (1876), still a basic reference work, assigned Sicilian coins to periods like "Finest Art (412-345 BC), Decline, Early (345-275 BC), Decline, Late (275-212 BC)," based on very naïve readings of the literary sources.

Often stratigraphic contexts are themselves dated using coins, creating the danger of circular arguments. Firm dating from stratigraphy requires a large range of specific stratigraphic contexts, preferably from multiple sites – often more than are available.[17] Hoards face similar problems, as well as issues of completeness because they are often the product of illegal excavation and broken up before they reach scholarly attention.[18] Finally, dating based on changes in weight and shape offers only general trends and is unhelpful when two series are of very similar shape and weight.

Thus all methods of dating coins face substantial issues. The situation is by no means hopeless; the use of these different methods in combination is often very persuasive and many coin datings are very stable. But no coin series' date can be accepted uncritically. Scholars relying on dates determined by coins must carefully examine the arguments behind the dating and must be particularly careful that the point they seek to prove with a specific coin's date is not the point originally used to establish that date.

Iconography

Coins have been studied from an iconographic point of view to talk productively about local identity, lost monuments' appearance, and conceptions of deities and ideals.[19] Most often, though, iconography is used to investigate the issuer's political messages,[20] which is what I will focus on here. This sort of study faces several pitfalls, not least the anachronistic connotations which the twentieth century experience has given to the concept of propaganda; ancient governments propagated messages on a much smaller scale at a much weaker intensity than modern states. But it would be wrong to assert that ancient governments did not propagate ideological messages at all and coins remain a valuable method of studying these messages.[21] Their value derives from the fact that they are actual products of ancient governments; studying them, one is looking at what was actually propagated, rather than trying to scry it through a literary filter.

This doesn't really decrease the interpretative difficulties, however. Like

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[17]Most excavation reports do not give the exact stratigraphic contexts of coins. Two exemplary reports are Buttrey et al. (1989) and Frey-Kupper (2013).

[18]Elkins (2012).

[19]Rutter (2000); Hill (1989); Borba Florenzano (2005).

[20]E.g. Sutherland (1976): 96-121 with stress on chronological sequence; Smith (1988), as one medium among many in the investigation of royal imagery. Manders (2012) investigates Emperors' changing ideological priorities through the changing frequency of different themes on Roman imperial coins.

[21]Meadows (2014).

all art, coin iconography can be analysed from the point of view of what the creator might have meant by it, a point of view of great historical significance for reconstructing ideological programmes, but also from the point of view of what viewers might have thought about it. The latter perspective offers opportunities, like the application of intertextual theory to coinage,[22] but also a problem: it is not clear how much attention people gave to the images on their coins. The tiny details which seem so significant to modern scholars may have gone completely unnoticed by contemporary viewers. Modern surveys often show that people are unable to even name the individuals depicted on their national currency, and one might doubt whether ancient people generally gave any more thought to their coins.[23] Actually, there is a fair amount of evidence that some viewers, sometimes, cared about the images on their coins. Close inspection was important in order to discern legitimate coins from forgeries in a way not required by modern coins.[24] An honorific decree from Sestos suggests coin imagery was valued for its own sake, when it praises a local notable for helping the city introduce its own bronze coinage "in order to put the city's symbol in circulation" (alongside an economic motive).[25] Finally, even if the images on coins themselves were little noticed, ancient governments produced images in many media, such as public art, spectacles, and official literature, of which coins happen to be unusually common, unusually hardy, and unusually clearly labelled. Details that appear small and insignificant to the viewer of a coin have significance as possible examples of images that the government originally propagated in a wider range of media which have not survived.[26]

Another problem for the study of coin iconography is that though study focusses on the meanings of the images themselves, this was not the only thing that imagery communicated. It also (primarily?) communicated information about the reliability of a coin, in the dangerous tightrope between material and legal value I mentioned above. A trusted design would be accepted more widely than something new and unknown. Consequently, coin designs are often very conservative. A good example of this conservativism comes from the early modern world: the *Thaler* issued by Empress Maria Theresa of Austria in 1741. The wide popularity and influence enjoyed by this coin as a trade currency is perhaps best indicated by etymology – 'Thaler' is the source of the word 'dollar.'

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[22]E.g. multicultural messages found in Seleukid coins: Iossif (2011).

[23]E.g. The Australian (2012).

[24]Plin.*HN*.33.132.

[25]*OGIS* #339; an alternative interpretation: Martin (1996).

[26]E.g. Rose (2005) finds coin iconography a useful supplement to literary and artistic evidence in his discussion of state depictions of the Parthians under Emperor Augustus.

Maria Theresa's *Thaler* was issued by mints from Europe to India without the slightest iconographic alteration, circulating widely in the Persian Gulf, Ethiopia, and East Africa until 1962. Attempts to introduce replacements, especially by the Italian colonial government in Ethiopia, were stymied by consumers' dedication to it.[27] Neither Maria Theresa nor her Empire were important or even known to minters or users of these coins – the importance of their iconography was solely that it indicated a trustworthy unit of value. This phenomenon means that the preservation or borrowing of coinage iconography cannot be analysed simply as a product of government message-making. But it also means that changes to coin designs have more significance than coins' small size might suggest: any change suggests governmental desire to propagate a message was strong enough to overrule the danger of disrupting the trust the existing design enjoyed.[28]

The take-home message is that coin iconography and changes to that iconography can be used to investigate the messages of ancient governments, among other things, but only with an awareness of coins' uncertain place in ancient individuals' experiences and of the powerful influence of coins' economic role on every aspect of their form.

Coins and economic policy

Another thing that we might want to study about coins is how they operated in the ancient economy – an obscure and controversial topic.[29] The one ancient source devoted to finance, the *Oeconomica* falsely attributed to Aristotle, has famously little to say about political economy. Evidence scattered through other sources demonstrates some consciousness and deliberation about monetary policy, but remains deeply cryptic.[30] Coinage evidence does not resolve the debate, but offers a valuable avenue for moving it forwards. One study showed that Mithridates VI of Pontos only minted in the lead up to war – suggesting rulers simply minted coins when they had troops to pay. Other evidence argues for greater thought about monetary policy in some cases, such as Ptolemy I's overvaluation of his coinage (discussed below).[31] Much work remains to be done.

We might want to quantify things by establishing how many coins govern-

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[27] Semple (2006).

[28] Unless the government issued the new design to distance itself from a coinage which had lost trust.

[29] The nature of the ancient economy is hotly debated, as is the importance of coins within it. A summary of the vast literature on the subject can be found in Cartledge (1998).

[30] E.g. Meikle (1996) on Aristotle; the Sestos decree cited in note 24; the Athenian Coinage decree demanding that all tribute to Athens be paid in Athenian coins: Lewis (1987).

[31] Mithridates: de Callataÿ (1997).

ments actually issued. Some scholars have attempted this, by identifying the number of dies used in an issue and multiplying that by the number of coins produced by an individual die.[32] There has been substantial opposition to this approach. The average number of coins produced by a given die is not known, nor is it known how dies' durability varied through time and space. It appears likely that the variation was extremely high – that a given die could produce anywhere between tens of thousands of coins and half a dozen. Statistical studies indicate this obstacle is insurmountable.[33] Nevertheless, a greater number of dies probably does suggest a greater number of coins produced; even if it isn't possible to quantify the number of coins, estimates of relative size are probably valid and useful.

We might also extract information about monetary policy by metallurgical analysis, traditionally used to establish the provenance of the precious metals used in coins.[34] To do this, it must be assumed that a coin's metal all came from a single mine and that no mixing (e.g. from the recycling of old coins or bullion) has occurred. This assumption is probably not sound, though what appears a stumbling block may soon become an opportunity, as current research in metallurgy is developing ways of determining whether mixing has occurred and in what ways – interesting information in its own right.[35] Another, more productive, use of metallurgical analysis has been establishing the purity of the metals used in coins over time, using it as a proxy for the financial health of the issuing governments, with low purity or dramatic fluctuations explained by and informing interpretations of historical circumstances.[36] Here the issues are more practical than methodological. For such a study to be statistically significant, it must make use of a large number of coins. For many issues, particularly from the Greek world, such samples are difficult to find, let alone gather together and subject to chemical testing. Further, the outside of coins sometimes differs in purity from the interior, either because it has been coated in purer metal to mislead or because corrosion of the exterior has decreased its purity. A truly accurate test needs to investigate the coins' internal purity. Most methods of doing this are destructive and therefore unpopular with the museums and collectors who own the coins.[37] The opportunities are thus far better for Roman coins, which exist in vast quantities, than for Greek coins, which are generally rarer.

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[32]de Callataÿ et al. (1993); de Callataÿ (2005). Carter (1983) explains how to estimate the number of dies actually used from the number of dies attested.

[33]Buttrey (1993) and (1994).

[34]Examples of interesting results: Howgego (1995): 24-26.

[35]E.g. Bray & Pollard (2012).

[36]E.g. Walker (1980).

[37]Northover (1998) describes the method.

Another method by which coins can inform questions of economic policy is metrology, the study of the weights and denominations of coins. Ancient coins' value derived from the fact that they contained a set amount of precious metal, but the standard used varied from mint to mint. Athenian coins were based on a *drachma* which weighed 4.34g, while the coins of the neighbouring island of Aigina were based on a *drachma* of 6.24g.[38] Coins of the same weight standard could be exchanged easily, as could coins which were multiples of another weight standard (e.g. 7 Aiginetan *drachmai* were almost the same weight as 10 Athenian *drachmai*). But, when weight standards were incompatible, people had to fall back on a coin's value as a lump of precious metal, either melting it down or exchanging it for relevant coinage through a moneychanger, at significant cost.[39] In that case it might be cheaper for a merchant to just trade goods for goods and it appears that such incompatibilities were significant barriers to trade using coinage. Whether the initial development of these incompatibilities was intentional or an accident of local variation remains uncertain, but it is clear that when ancient states changed the weight of their coins this was an act of economic significance.

The most famous example took place under Ptolemy I of Egypt (r. 323-283 BC). Initially, on taking over the Egyptian portion of Alexander's empire, he minted silver coins on the same weight standard as Alexander's other successors (*tetradrachma* of 17.2g). Between 310 and 290 BC, he lowered the weight to 14.35g. The result of this change is clear: his coinage, which had circulated throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, no longer left Egypt. Three explanations for the change have been proposed, all based on the fact the Egypt has no natural source of silver. The first argues that the change was a simple overvaluation, intended to stretch the limited silver supply further in a time of crisis.[40] The second argues that the goal was preventing Egyptian silver from leaving the country by artificially constructing one of the barriers to trade discussed above.[41] The third suggests that the regime hoped to profit from the incompatibility, making foreign merchants convert their coins to Egyptian ones at a one to one basis and keeping the extra silver.[42] Any combination of these is possible, largely depending on the degree of economic awareness one is willing to credit to Ptolemy and his chums.[43] The multiple possibilities highlight the complex

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[38]Overviews of the major weight standards: Kraay (1976): 329-330; Boehringer (2000); Crawford (1974): 2.590-597.

[39]*P.Cair.Zen.*1.59021.

[40]Emmons (1954): 81-83.

[41]Zervos (1976): 52-54.

[42]Le Rider (1998).

[43]Cf. Mørkholm (1991): 64-67.

arguments which metrology enables, but also the difficulty of establishing certainty.

Coins in circulation

Another way to investigate the role of ancient coins in the economy is to look at the way they were used after production, though in practice this can rarely be detached from the issues of government policy discussed above, especially since much of ancient government policy seems to have been reactive. The primary use of coins – spending them – unfortunately leaves no direct traces whatsoever for us to study. Another, possibly common, use – melting them down – probably leaves no trace either.[44] Only two things that people did with coins leave traces for us: dropping them and hoarding them.

The interpretation of these two types of trace requires awareness of the way they were dropped and found. Dropped coins tend to be isolated low value coins that their owners could not be bothered to scrounge around on the ground for, usually bronze or tiny denomination silver. They are deposited in a single moment and collect in stratigraphic layers in the same way as pot sherds and other detritus of the past. Most were probably a product of everyday life and commerce; they tend to cluster in public spaces. They are mostly uncovered in a useful way only in controlled excavations and then their usefulness depends on the detail they are published in.[45] Areas which are not well-excavated, or whose excavation publications are not easily accessible to Western scholarship, like North Africa, the Balkans, Syria, Iran, and the Black Sea, are under-represented. Hoards by contrast tend to be large collections of the highest value coins, intentionally stored in the ground for safe-keeping. Sometimes they represent the deposit of a single moment, but often they seem to have been built up over decades as the owner of the hoard added and removed coins. The owner presumably intended to recover all the money at some point in most cases (there are religious exceptions). The hoards that come down to us represent only the cases when they failed for some reason, probably personal or public catastrophe, and are therefore abnormal; Peaks in a graph of hoards over time might indicate warfare rather than prosperity. The overwhelming majority of hoards are found in unrecorded, illegal excavations.[46] Occasionally they can be pieced together when the police manage to catch looters or based on a sudden influx of coins onto the art market,

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[44]But see note 35.

[45]See note 17.

[46]On one occasion a *metric ton* of ancient coins (far more than even the largest museum collections) was smuggled through Frankfurt airport in *a few weeks*: Elkins (2012).

but both procedures are problematic; most hoards' provenances are forever lost to the study of ancient history. Deposition and discovery, therefore, shape the kind of coins these two traces preserve and what they can tell us. Individual studies must consider whether they should rely on one, the other, or both.

Nevertheless, coins are uniquely suited for distribution studies, because they announce their place of origin so clearly, compared to most other ancient artefacts. On a single site, the distribution of coins can contribute to reconstructions of the use of space, suggesting frequency and type of use.[47] Additionally, coins can tell us about a site's wider engagement with the world. A notable example is the city of Dura-Europus on the Euphrates River. The bronze coins found there are almost all from Antioch. Bronze doesn't usually travel far from its point of origin, because its token value is a function of the regulatory system that produced it. The findings at Dura-Europus thus demonstrate a deep and unequal relationship with Antioch – a significant fact given that for two hundred years they were on opposite sides of a militarised border.[48]

Conclusions can also be drawn from the distribution of coins over a wide area. Howgego provides a dramatic example, showing that the spread of coinage in the Late European Iron Age matched the eventual extent of Roman imperial control and that the Iron Age patterns continued largely unchanged in Roman Britain – introducing new evidence into the study of Roman expansion.[49] Studies of distribution, then, can be highly informative – and seductive, since they appear in the authoritative form of the map. When viewing this data, it is important to keep the aforementioned caveats in mind. It is also vitally important not to assume that the distribution of coins is a simple cypher for trade networks. Coins were only one product traded in ancient times and were influenced by unique factors, like weight standards, which did not apply to other trade goods. Thus coin data's true significance can only be known when considered alongside the distribution of other materials, particularly pot sherds, and with the acknowledgement that others, like grain, cannot now be mapped.

Conclusions

I have presented some major ways in which coins can be used to talk about ancient history, their opportunities and their challenges. As you've read this, you may have concluded that coins' power to explain anything about the ancient

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[47]E.g. looking at a single *insula* at Pompeii: Hobbs (2011) or the fort at Nijmegen: Kemmers (2007).

[48]Bellinger (1949).

[49]Howgego (2013).

world is limited. You are absolutely right. Coins are no less limited in their explanatory power than any other type of source. It is not good practice to cursorily refer to specialist coinage studies as if they solve everything. But neither is it good practice to ignore them. Coins have a unique combination of strengths that other sources don't have: their ancient and modern prevalence, their clear announcement of their place and time of origin, their status as direct products of government, their role as artefacts of everyday life, and their non-narrative nature. When used with awareness of their strengths and limitations, alongside other sources, they can illuminate (or problematize) areas where other sources cast no light.

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Interpreting *Amour*:
Love as an Endless Hermeneutic

Meindert Peters[*]

Department of Modern Languages

In *Amour*, the 2012 film by director Michael Haneke, the audience is presented with an idea of love in terms of duration. Anne and Georges, a couple in their eighties, are living their everyday lives when Anne suddenly falls ill. The film portrays the pair as having to constantly renegotiate the understanding they have of one another. This constant reinterpretation resembles French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion's idea of love as an endless hermeneutic. Another person, he argues, presents us with an abundance of information that we can never fully grasp nor negotiate. He calls this saturated phenomenon 'the face' and argues that the only way in which we can react to the impossibility of understanding that it represents is by loving. By reading *Amour* through Marion's idea of love, this essay will posit an understanding of the film in which the face-to-face relations between Anne and Georges and the constant reinterpretations that their non-understanding requires are foregrounded. Moreover, the film's dramatic conclusion shows not only that love may indeed be eternal in its endless hermeneutic, but also that such an eternity is unbearable when 'the face' remains present even after death.

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[*]Email: Meindert.Peters@new.ox.ac.uk

Although *Amour* is about love, this 2012 film by director Michael Haneke does not follow the Hollywood trope of a passionate love joining two hearts as one. Instead it focuses on love's duration. Anne and Georges are a couple in their eighties who have been together almost all of their lives when Anne suddenly falls ill. The story follows Anne's gradual decline and Georges' ceaseless care for her. When pain seems to have taken over every aspect of their lives Georges smothers Anne with a pillow. Before reaching this dramatic conclusion, however, the film emphasizes Georges' tireless struggle to understand his deteriorating wife. In a similar way, philosopher Jean-Luc Marion suggests that the continuous process of trying to comprehend another person imposes on us an endless hermeneutic that we can only address with love.

For Marion this other person – particularly their face – is a saturated phenomenon, one which we can never grasp nor understand.[1] Marion posits several such saturated phenomena.[2] An event, for example, is saturated by quantity, in that there are so many things happening at one time, that it is impossible to process and understand them in the present moment. Similarly, 'the face' is saturated in terms of modality: the mode in which it expresses itself goes beyond our capability to understand – it 'escape[s] all relation with thought in general' – so that we are unable to process 'the face' and reach an understanding of another person.[3] Marion argues that 'the face' of this other person gives us so many meanings that we can never finish our picture of them. We are, thus, stuck in a hermeneutic trying to finalise an understanding of that person, a process which is infinite. The only way to deal with 'the face' of a person then is to avoid 'constituting it as an object, but to interpret it in loving it.'[4]

In *Amour* there are several moments where we see that Anne and Georges are, even after many years, still surprised by, and trying to understand, one another. Nothing, however, marks the enigma that is 'the face' better than Anne's sickness, which challenges Georges on a daily basis to adjust the picture he has constructed of his wife. The scene in which her illness first becomes apparent, while they are having breakfast in the kitchen, articulates the impossibility of comprehending 'the face' of another person, both visually and in speech. Georges is talking happily to Anne when he realises that she has stopped responding. We see Anne's

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[1] Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1946) takes the idea of 'the face' [visage] from French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995) who, in his *Totality and Infinity [Totalité et Infini]*, writes: '[t]he way in which the other presents himself, exceeding *the idea of the other in me*, we here name face.' Levinas, *Totality*, 50.

[2] Marion, *In Excess*, 118. Marion's *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena* (2002) was first published in the French language as *De Surcroît: Études sur les Phénomènes Saturés* in 2001.

[3] Marion, *In Excess*, 112-3.

[4] Ibid., 127.

Figure 1: Still from *Amour*. Dir. Michael Haneke. (10:04)

face, in a medium shot, from over Georges' shoulder – she is looking back at him. He tries to understand her by looking into her face, asking 'Anne, what's happening, what's wrong?'[5] He then places his hands on her face, grasping her physically as though this might help him to stabilise his understanding of her (see figure 1). He repeats the questions. Anne does not respond, but her face talks.[6] Together with Georges, we see at this moment a face that we can endlessly attempt to read, and yet, we become aware that we can never understand what is going on inside Anne. In this scene Anne's face is offered up to Georges and the viewer in much the same way that Marion argues 'the face' 'shows itself'; 'the face' is ever present, whether or not we look for it.[7] Before we can look, before we can try to put a stable meaning onto 'the other person', we are already overwhelmed by the abundance of information they present to us. This scene is especially significant as it marks the beginning of Georges' daily task of attempting to redefine who his wife is. It is at this point that the endless hermeneutic presents itself most clearly; after this event even the illusion of understanding Anne is no longer an option.

Haneke's use of Anne's and Georges' house as the setting for almost all of the film serves to highlight the idea that 'the face' is ever present and constantly in need of interpretation. Except for two early scenes the whole film takes place within the four walls of their apartment. In this claustrophobic setting we are constantly under their skin, just as they are under each other's. The renegotiating of their new roles with one another – Anne requiring care and Georges as her caregiver – thus, takes place within a confined space. Their faces are never far

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[5]Haneke, *Amour*, 9:46-10:24. 'Anne, qu'est-ce qui se passe? Qu'est-ce qu'il y a?'
[6]Ibid., 7:44-15:15.
[7]Marion, *In Excess*, 116.

away from one another. This closeness is emphasized by several scenes in which Georges has to help Anne move – in the bathroom, to her wheelchair, etc. – putting their two faces in very close proximity. In *Amour* 'the face' is everywhere.

According to Marion the quality of love depends on duration because the hermeneutic can only be concluded at the end of life: '[t]o envisage a face requires less to see it than to wait for it, to wait for its accomplishment, the terminal act, the passage of effectivity.'[8] The relationship between Anne and Georges perfectly embodies this kind of love, measured by duration. Of course, being in their eighties they have had a long relationship and are now drawing close to death. But there is also an extreme patience in the way their relationship is acted out. For example, when Georges helps a half-paralyzed Anne move around the room, we get an understanding of their endless love; step by little step they move around the room, his face close to hers, watching her intently at every moment. This scene makes the extreme duration present in the hermeneutic visible to us.

This endless hermeneutic between Anne and Georges, the close proximity of their faces and the way in which they love through continually attempting to understand one another, finds a stark contrast in the way in which Anne's second nurse treats her. According to Marion, 'the face' that is given before it is sought puts on us 'the injunction "Thou shalt not kill!"'[9] It should be pointed out that, for Marion, 'to kill', though it could also be taken literally, has the metaphorical sense of 'objectivization to an insignificant term, entirely annulled, henceforth without force or proper value.'[10] One might argue then, that the nurse's rough treatment of Anne, turning her around like an object, talking to her like a child, indeed is a form of killing her. Thus, Georges' enduring love, which is realised through constant, shifting interpretation, is contrasted with Anne's objectification by the nurse.

And yet this metaphorical killing raises the question of how we might explain Georges' literal killing of Anne, by way of covering her face with a pillow, at the end of the film. The pain Anne is clearly enduring could be seen as reason enough for Georges to kill her out of love, with the sole desire of ending her suffering. But Marion offers us another way of regarding this act. He states that

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[8]Marion, *In Excess*, 122.

[9]Ibid., 116. Marion takes this ethical injunction from Lévinas as the primary injunction forwarded by 'the face', yet, disagrees that it may be the only one: '[i]n effect, the injunction "Thou shalt not kill!" is exercised first as an injunction, independently of its contents. One could replace it with other injunctions, just as strong, whether existentielle - "Become who you are!"; existential - "Determine yourself as the being for whom being is at stake"; religious - "Love your God with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your mind"; moral - "Do not unto others what you would not want done unto you"; even erotic - "Love me."' (118).

[10]Ibid., 126.

after death 'the face of the other' will be forever present in us: 'even after the death of this face, hermeneutics must be pursued, in a memory no less demanding than the present vision.'[11] In other words, one can kill a person but they will always live on in memory, as an image of 'the face' to the mind, forever in need of interpretation. The duration of love is, thus, eternal since there is no 'terminal act' in which the other person can be understood as Marion suggests earlier in his essay.[12] In this way, Georges is able to kill his wife physically, kill her agency and kill her suffering, knowing that her face will live forever in himself; in Marion's words: 'every face demands immortality – if not its own, at least that of the one who envisages it.'[13] Indeed, after Anne's death Georges sees her again in the kitchen. Were he to live forever, so would she. And yet the film also suggests that this kind of presence of 'the face', which requires endless interpretation, is unbearable without the physical presence of that person. This unbearableness is not only suggested by an ambiguous ending in which Georges may or may not kill himself, may or may not die,[14] but also because this same ambiguous ending draws attention to the viewer's own interpretative task. As the credits of the film start to roll we understand that we will also never have a resolution to our question: what happened to Georges? Yet, whereas we as an audience can go home and forget about the film's ending, Georges, Haneke has made clear through Anne's reappearance after her death, will continue to be haunted by the presence of 'the face' of his wife. Interestingly, then, the very ambiguity of the ending of the film and the question of what happens to Georges, emphasises the unbearableness of his situation of endless interpretation and shows why he might be driven to kill himself. We come to see love as a sort of cat-and-mouse game in which there is always the promise of capture, but never the resolution, as an endless hermeneutic that is incredibly painful when the promise of a resolution withdraws.

Both Haneke's film and Marion's philosophy advance an idea of love as an eternal interpretation of 'the face' of another person. The relation between Georges and Anne, in its duration, in its closed-space setting, in its renegotiating of roles, visualises Marion's philosophy of 'the face' of 'the other person' as ever present, always giving more than can be received, understood, negotiated. This 'face' cannot be killed, it cannot be eliminated, thus, the only thing that one

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[11]Marion, *In Excess*, 126.

[12]Ibid., 122.

[13]Ibid., 126.

[14]Dima, in his "Sound, death, and Amour," interprets Georges as dying at least symbolically when he plants his own face in the pillow after having smothered Anne with it. And although he does not read Georges as dying physically in the film he does read his final walking out of the door as his going to seek out this 'second [death].' Dima, "Sound, death, and *Amour*," 175.

can do is to interpret it forever. But this endless hermeneutic, *Amour* shows, is only bearable with the promise of an understanding. What Anne and Georges exemplify is not only Marion's idea that, if one keeps interpreting another person, love can be eternal, but also the pain of knowing that there cannot be a solution. They teach us that love's enigmas can have no answer.

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